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Introduction 
In any form of government the principle of separation of powers divides the state powers into three branches: the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers. According to this principle, adopting laws/policies is vested to the 
legislative; most policy initiatives are enacted into law, and thus must be approved by the legislature. The very 
name of this branch suggests law making and is assumed to be the primary function of legislative branch; and 
this function consumes considerable time and energy of the same (Birkland, 2001). Legislatures are required to 
identify problems, study issues, receive expert and public inputs, formulate or approve policies that are designed 
to remedy the problems or issues. 
The extent and nature of legislatures in playing their law/policymaking role vary significantly from 
country to country. The legislature role in the policy making is, in the first place, dependent upon its relationship 
with other political institutions and actors, most notably, chief executives in presidential systems, cabinet 
members in parliamentary system and party elites in those systems characterized by strong political parties 
(David & Michael, 1991). Some legislatures are proactively able to develop their own legislative proposals and 
thus participate along with the executive in directing the policy agenda (Saiegh, 2008). Such legislatures are also 
likely to be active and effective in overseeing policy implementation (ibid). At the other end, legislatures may be 
fairly marginal players, serving as a rubber stamp on the executives legislative proposals and having little 
capacity or willingness to scrutinize the conduct of government. Although,  there is a wide area between these 
two extremes, most scholars agree  in developing countries, the impact of the legislative bodies' in public 
policymaking is not only much less that they are also passive instruments that can be manipulated rather than 
active contributors (Gridle and Thomas, 1991). 
In the history of Ethiopia, the 1931 constitution was a landmark for the legislature to the present day. 
The constitution convened the first bicameral parliament and concisely defined the structure of the legislature to 
consist of two deliberative chambers. The chamber of Senate were to consist of members appointed by the 
emperor drawn from the nobility where as the Chamber of Deputies were appointed by the nobility and local 
chiefs until such time as the people were considered ready to elect the members of chambers of deputies 
themselves (The 1931  Constitution, Article 31 & 32). Likewise, in the 1955 revised Constitution the Senate 
were formed from elite groups such as the princes, high government officials and other local governments 
appointed by the Emperor. Differing considerably from the 1931, members of the Chamber of Deputies were 
elected by the people of Ethiopia. In both cases, however, the ultimate power was still in the hands of the 
Emperor; and the power of approving and disapproving parliamentary legislations resided on the supremacy of 
the monarch. The parliament was neither meant to carry out the usual functions of an elected legislature, nor was 
it a source of public authority. Shiferaw in Mulugeta Abebe (2005) also commented that, there had never been 
any channel of communication between the public and those at the top of policymaking structures; and 
consulting the affected parties both before and after policy decisions was not in practice. 
After the downfall of the Emperor in 1974, for thirteen years, there had been no written constitution in 
Ethiopia that provided the constitutional base for policymaking. The Derg dissolved the imperial parliament and 
officially declared the establishment of a Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC, 1974). 
Afterwards, the policymaking had been entertained by a limited circle of Provisional Military Administrative 
Council (PMAC) which had practically alleged on agenda setting and the policymaking process (Mulugeta, 
2005). After the declaration of the 1987 constitution, although in theory it was claimed that public power resided 
in the national Assembly called National Shengo, it was the party that made policy choices and decisions in 
advance. This is because the constitution empowered the party to be the leading organ of the state as well as the 
society (Constitution, 1987). Furthermore, in the wake of the establishment of Peoples Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, the newly emerging state organ, administrative and autonomous regions were integrated into the 
machinery of central planning, party and state institutions. Thus, it can be conclude that in both regimes the job 
of the legislature was passive and was a type of rubber-stamp or merely endorsing already made policy decisions.  
Since the 1990’s, Ethiopia has transformed from a nearly  failed state as a result of various brutal dictatorships, 
to  one that has made progress through introducing radical political and structural changes. A new Constitution 
was adopted in 1995, establishing a Federal Democratic Republic. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia has brought about fundamental constitutional and political changes and has fundamentally 
influenced the policymaking process in Ethiopia. Since then, Ethiopia has conducted four elections held within a 
legal framework institutionalizing pluralism and democracy. These changes have, inter alia, necessitated the 
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formulation and implementation of economic and social policies that will give effect to the principles embodied 
in the new Constitution. The structure of government and the principles of policymaking entrenched in the 
Constitution, aimed at redressing the imbalances created by the past. Accordingly, Ethiopia is structured along 
the lines of bicameral parliament consisting of a Federal Council and a House of Peoples’ Representatives where 
both a federal government and a state shall have legislative, executive and judicial powers (FDRE Constitution, 
1995). The legislative organs are constitutionally declared to be the highest political authority and the law 
making power is vested on the same. Being one of the most important tasks of the parliament, policymaking is 
the chief device of elected bodies used to represent the needs and wishes of citizens through the policymaking 
process.  
The contemporary Ethiopia, struggling for a century to establish constitutional state to realize 
democracy, needs institutions that are capable of formulating good laws/policies in both the political sense of 
getting agreement from participants, and in the technical sense of achieving the intended purposes. Recognizing 
this fact, unlike the previous regimes, both the government, national and international institutions were actively 
engaged to improve the institutional capacity of the Parliament.  
Thus the primary focus of this study is to assess a broad sense of the present circumstance of Ethiopian 
legislatures (HoPRs), their role in the policy making process, their institutional capacity and potential to become 
an important actor in the policymaking process as defined by the law of land. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Most researchers conducted in public policy discipline focus on analyzing the link between goals, actions, and 
outcomes, and some on exploring the inputs in the making of public policy which may include the actors, 
resources and structures involved. The researcher believes that whilst it is important to address policy issues 
through all those ways, it is also relevant to explore the practice of the main policymaking institutions, which is 
the base for any policy decisions to take proactive measures. Accordingly, this research will concentrate on the 
policymaking practice and challenges, and institutional capacity of the legislature in Ethiopia, which is scanty in 
the research arena.  
 
Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of the study is to assess the policymaking power, function and institutional capacity of the 
House of Peoples’ Representative; and their link with other policy actors such as the executive, the public, civil 
society organizations, think-tank and research organization; and the institutional capacity of the existing 
legislature through an extensive review of literature and empirical evidences. Specifically the study set out: 
1. To examine how well the legislature performs its policymaking function as it is stipulated in the 
constitution and in light of generally accepted policymaking theories, and principles. 
2. To explain the extent of legislature effort to involve the public, civil society organizations, think-
tank and research organizations in the policymaking process.  
3. To evaluate capacity of the legislative infrastructure to deliver its policymaking function.  
4. To identify factors that affects the policymaking role of the legislature.  
5. To suggest possible strategies that would help the legislature to mitigate their challenges.  
 
Research Questions  
In order to attain the objectives of the study, this research attempts to answer the following basic questions: 
1. How well does the legislature perform its policymaking function as it is granted by the constitution, 
other laws and in light of certain policymaking theories and principles? 
2. To what extent does the Ethiopian legislature involve the public, civil society organizations, think-
tank and research organizations in the policymaking process? 
3. How well do systems of legislative infrastructure help the legislature perform its functions in 
Ethiopia? 
4. What factors affect the policymaking role of the Ethiopian legislature? 
 
Definition of Key Terms 
Policy:  A definite course or method of action selected (by government, institution, group or individual) from 
among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and, usually, to determine present and 
future decisions (Webster's dictionary).  
Public Policy: is a statement by government on what it intends to do or not to do such as law, regulation, 
decision or order, or a combination of these that govern a particular issue areas or problem (Birkland, 
2001:9).  
Legislature: the term ‘‘legislature’’ and “parliament’’ are used “interchangeably as generic terms for the elected 
representative body.” In the context of this study legislature refers the HoPRs 
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Policy Process:  the policy processes can be placed in three groups, namely: Policy making processes (including 
formulation and legitimization), Policy implementation processes (also known as the executive process) 
and Policy analysis and evaluation processes (Cloete, 1994: 102). 
Policymaking: Policymaking involves a series of interrelated phases in the process of making vital policy 
decisions involving: identifying policy problems, setting agenda for decision making, formulating 
policy proposals, legitimating policies by the action of a lawmaking body (legislature). 
 
Literature Review 
This chapter provides the key concept and theories of public policy. The theories aim to clarify issues that are 
associated with public policymaking and the role of policymakers.  The different forms of government are also 
described to attest where real policymaking power resides in each government systems. The conceptual issues 
concentrate upon the Parliamentary form of government and the role of major actors such as legislators and 
executives and their institutional infrastructure to affect the policy.   
The 1931 Constitution, the first constitution gifted by emperor Haile Selassieis considered as a pioneer 
to institutionalize a government in Ethiopia. The Emperor established a parliament of two houses, the chamber 
of Senate or Upper House (Yehig Mewesegna Mikirbet) was to consist of members appointed by the emperor 
drawn from among the nobility where as the Chamber of Deputies or Lower House (Yehig Memria Mikirbet) are 
appointed by the nobility and local chiefs until such time as the people were considered ready to elect the 
members of chambers of deputies themselves (The 1931 Constitution, article 31 & 32). Although the Emperor 
appeared to be establishing a basis for the rule of law, the parliament was in fact powerless and merely a vehicle 
for the continued consolidation of his authority. The mastermind of this new arrangement, from Haile Selassie's 
perspective, was that it created the illusion of a modem parliamentary system while destroying the old power 
bases and further concentrating absolute power into his own hands (Alemante G. Selassie, 1992).  
The next happening that brought somewhat a better pattern in Ethiopian parliament is the revised 
constitution of 1955. The constitution embodied significant changes such as the acknowledgment of separation 
of powers, the introduction of a popularly elected body with actual legislative ability. It appeared with a 
provision that members of the lower house should be elected by universal adult suffrage and has given the lower 
house a power base separate from the emperor. But the senate remained an appointed chamber with members 
still chosen from the nobility and other prominent persons for 6 year term by the emperor (Constitution, 1955). 
However, the legitimacy of the Emperor was still unquestioned by most. The emperor had unrestricted 
constitutional powers, extraordinarily exceeding the power of the legislature, including the power to declare war, 
appoint judges, disclose parliament, negotiate as well as sign treaties. Moreover, the constitution invested a 
sovereignty of the empire in the emperor with the power to determine the organization powers and duties of all 
government departments and to appoint and dismiss government officials, the prime minister and all other 
ministers   (Article, 26&27, 66). 
After the dawn fall of Haileselasse in 1974, the Derg suspended the 1955 constitution and dissolved the 
emperor parliament. However there had no any written constitution for thirteen years until 1987, it officially 
declared the establishment of Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) in place of the Emperial 
government. Towards 1977, the Derg introduced a congress, consisted of all surviving members of the Derg, the 
central committee composed of 32 members elected by the former and 16 standing committee members elected 
by the congress from the members of the central committee; and promulgated legislation that guides the 
policymaking process in the country (Meheret, 1997). Regarding the process of policymaking Shiferaw in 
Mulugeta (2005) stated that the legal department in the office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers had to 
initiate laws; the draft laws  were to be sent to the Legal Committee, whose members include the Ministry of 
Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Finance, and  the Deputy Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, a representative from the National Planning Supreme Council, the Department Head of Legal Affairs in 
the Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the Minister or Head of the Agency sponsoring the 
draft legislation would deliberate the spirit of the legislation, and send that to the PMAC via the Office of the 
Council of Ministers (CoM) for approval. Nevertheless he noted that there were exceptions to the established 
procedure, when draft laws were assigned to a group of experts particularly established to examine bills and 
asked to provide their opinion and recommendation; and in some other cases, legislation was referred to a joint 
Legal and Administrative Committee or to a joint Legal and Economic Committee, all of which are established 
by the Office of the Council of Ministers (ibid). After having studied and fused their insight, the draft legislation 
would be sent to the Provisional Administrative Council for final approval; and the proclamation was published 
in Negarit Gazeta by the name of PMAC.  
In 1979, even though the same personality remained in the leadership positions, the virtual power of 
decision making over the years shifted from the PMAC to the Commission for Organizing the Working People 
of Ethiopia (COPWE) which letter transformed to Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984. According to 
Mulugeta (2005) after the establishment of the party, the Derg claimed that the single most important actor in the 
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socio-economic policymaking process was the party of the working people with its philosophy and ideology of 
Marxism and Leninism. Although much of the statutory declarations were often made in the name of Derg, since 
the end of the 1970, WPE, together with the principle of Marxism and Leninism assumed a virtual control over 
the entire socio economic policymaking process (ibid).  
After promulgating the 1987 Constitution, the supreme organ of state power resides to the National 
Shengo (National Assembly) which had 835 members. Candidates to the National Shengo had to be nominated 
by regional branches of the WPE, mass organizations, military units, and other associations recognized by law 
and balloting for seats in the National Shengo was required to be secret. Elected members served five-year terms, 
and the body met in regular session once each year. The responsibility of National Shengo included: amending 
the constitution; determining foreign, defense, and security policy; establishing the boundaries, status, and 
accountability of administrative regions; and approving economic plans (PDRE, 1987). The other important 
organ in the policymaking practice was the Council of State. The Council of State had further authority to issue 
decrees in the pursuit of the duties stipulated by law or assigned by the National Shengo. Moreover it exercised 
the national legislative role when the National Shengo was not in session (Alemante, 1992).  The 1987 
constitution clearly stipulated that the party is the leading organ of the state as well as the society’ (PDRE,1987). 
Furthermore, in the wake of the establishment of PDRE, the newly emerging state organ, administrative and 
autonomous regions were integrated into the machinery of central planning, party and state institutions. 
Alemante (ibid) also noted that the party and the executive use the legislature to legitimize their action, but will 
keep the legislature distant from actual policymaking process.  
After a long time struggle and downfall of the Derg regime in 1991, based on the Transitional Period 
Charter, the Transitional Parliament, namely, the Council of Representatives was formed as a supreme organ of 
power for the transition period. The incumbent Constitution, which was designated as the “Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” was promulgated in August 1995, on which this study is based. 
It was after a long period of political evolution and restructuring that Ethiopia came to abolish the 
system of unitary government and introduced the operating federal system.  The Ethiopian Constitution, which 
was designated as the ‘‘Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,’’ was promulgated, and 
Ethiopia become a federal country in 1995. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution 
established a Federal Republic constituting nine autonomous states and two City administrations that are 
accountable to the federal government. The Constitution enumerates the powers of the two tiers of government 
i.e Federal and Regional, and defines the basic structure and organization of the federal and regional states 
(Article 50, 51&52). Each of the federal and members states exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers 
within their mandates and are autonomous (Article 58). Accordingly, all powers not given expressly to the 
federal government alone or concurrently exercised with the regional governments are given to regional 
government. 
The Federal Parliament is bicameral, consisting of the Federal Council and the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives. The House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR) is the highest authority of the Federal 
Government as the supreme organ in the country and retains legislature powers over all matters of federal 
jurisdictions. It is the institution which enjoys the decisional, control and representative powers of legislature. As 
stipulated in the Constitution (Article, 54) the maximum number of seats for elected representatives in the HoPR 
is 550, of which at least 20 are reserved for minority nationalities and peoples (Sub-article 3). The member of 
HoPR is elected from candidates in each electoral district (constituting a population of 100,000) by a plurality of 
the votes cast for five years. Members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives as a whole and have the liberty 
to pay their allegiance to the constitution, the will of the people and their conscience (Sub article, 2&4).  As is 
most likely the case around the world, Members of the Parliament (MPs) enjoy immunity from prosecution and 
will not be subject to any criminal and civil proceedings while attending to legislative duties unless caught in 
flagrante delicto. However, a member may lose his/her mandate of representation upon loss of confidence by the 
electorate (Sub-article, 6&7). The House of Peoples’ Representative is central to this paper and thus its powers, 
functions and practice are dealt with in next sections.  
The second parliament, the House of Federation (HoF), as provided under the Constitution Article (61), 
is composed of representatives of nations, nationalities and peoples of each nation. Every one of the nations, 
nationalities and people is represented by one member in the HoF, and those who have extra one million will 
have additional one member. Further, each state legislature or state council elects representatives to the HoF, or 
may opt to have the people elect their representative (Sub-article 2 & 3). The House of Federation holds a unique 
and extraordinary position. Unlike conventional federal systems, the HoF serves as the representative institution 
of nation nationalities in Ethiopia.  It has essentially the same representation, but in the FDRE Constitution, this 
is formulated in a slightly different way: it is not composed of representatives of the federal units, but ‘of 
representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ (Article 61, 2). As Lars (2001) notes, because of the 
historical and philosophical reasons, that constitutions have adopted different mechanisms for reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and decisions of government bodies. Therefore, uniquely, reviewing the 
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constitutionality of the laws and decisions of government is vested on HoF in Ethiopia. Currently HoF appointed 
120 members representing 75 Nation Nationalities, and Peoples. Distinct from other federal countries, HoF is a 
non-legislative institute, and is responsible to reviewing the issues of constitutionality. The most important 
function of the House of Federation is the power to interpret the constitution (Article, 62). In Ethiopia, the 
umpiring of constitutional disputes is not a purely legal matter, as it does involve arriving at a political solution. 
Though it is the HoF that has the authority to decide on “all constitutional disputes,” it is supported by a council 
of constitutional inquiry (composed of 11 members: the chief Justice and the Vice Chief Justice of the Federal 
Supreme Court, and six legal experts who are nominated by the House) which is established by the constitution 
with the power to investigate constitutional disputes (Article, 84). The council is, however, required to submit its 
recommendations to the HoF if it finds it necessary to interpret the constitution.  
The House of Federation is also empowered to order federal intervention if, in violation of the 
constitution, a member state endangers the constitutional order (Article 62, 9). Of course, this measure is to be 
taken if all efforts to stop the threat against the constitutional order are unsuccessful, so that the House is 
recognized as the ultimate defender of the constitutional compact of the peoples of Ethiopia.  The House of 
Federation has other specific functions. For instance, it is mandated to determine the division of revenues from 
the joint federal and state tax sources and the amount of federal subsidies to be provided to the member states 
(Article 62,7). 
The two Houses, HoPR and HoF differ from one another in their respective powers and functions 
except in those constitutionally-specified matters falling under their concurrent competence. For instance, both 
Houses are required in a joint session to take “appropriate measures when state authorities are unable to arrest 
violations of human rights within their jurisdiction” (Article, 55).  
Likewise, the executive branch of the government is established by the FDRE Constitution and has 
constitutionally entrusted powers and functions. Pursuant to the Ethiopian Constitution, the political party or 
coalition of political parties that has the greatest number of seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives 
assumes the power and take the lead of the government (Article 56 & 73 sub-article 2). This direct linkage 
makes the executive not only subservient to the House of Peoples’ Representatives but also its conduit through 
which the political programs of the majority party or a coalition of parties are implemented. Therefore, one can 
see a Westminster’s style executive government in the Ethiopian case. 
The executive branch of government mainly comprises of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister 
and Council of Ministers along with a ‘ceremonial’ President. Although the election of the Prime Minister is 
often concluded at the party forums, he/she shall be elected from among members of the HoPRs. The Prime 
Minister must have the HoPRs approval his nominees for the Ministerial position, who, together with him, 
constitute the executive (Article 74, 2). Both are accountable to the House of Peoples’ Representatives’; and in 
the exercise of State functions, members of the Council of Ministers are collectively responsible for all decision 
as per the Article 72(2). The executive presides over the entire implementation process of laws and socio-
economic and foreign policies of the country. 
The president, after nominated by HoPR, is elected by the joint session of the two Houses of the 
Ethiopian parliament by a two-third majority. Unlike the term of the two Houses, the term of the President is for 
six years and he/she can continue in office for another term. The constitutional design for the parliament and the 
president’s stay in office a year longer than the executive is to establish a continuity of government and linkage 
between the previous and the forthcoming terms (Fassil, 1997). The duties of the President include addressing 
the joint session of the parliament annually, appointing ambassadors, granting high military titles, and decorating 
high domestic and foreign dignitaries with medals and prizes (Article, 71). The role of the president in the 
policymaking process is limited to signing the bills into laws following their approval by the HoPR, although 
laws can still take effect within fifteen days with or without his signature (Article, 57). 
The 1995 Constitution further establishes an independent judiciary both at the federal and state levels 
(Article, 78).  The Ethiopian judiciary is composed of two parallel systems of federal and state courts, between 
which judicial authority is distributed and the federal judicial power lies in federal courts whereas state judicial 
power is attributed to state courts (Article, 78, Sub-article 2&3).  The judicial powers, both at federal and state 
levels, are vested on the courts (Article, 89, 1); and courts are authorized to check whether acts of the executive 
are in line with the principal legislation issued by parliament, and whether the executive is acting within the 
framework of the law. Although the courts are free to decide over all justifiable cases including those in which 
constitutional rights of citizens stand tall, their position is vague with regard to the power to interpret the 
constitution as the ultimate interpretive power is explicitly given to the HoF. Hence, legal professionals Tsegaye 
(2004), however, argue that there are no judicial reviews of legislative acts for constitutionality, and no standard 
is distinctively articulated for determining what constitutes ‘judicial power’ in Ethiopia. Assefa (2007) further 
claimed that being composed of representative of nationalities indirectly elected by the electorate at regional 
level, seems to consider the HoF as a political organ than judicial one.  
In general, the FDRE governance system is basically parliamentarian, and comprises the federal 
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government and state members, both with legislative, executive and judicial powers. The power of the 
government is established where the political party or parties with the greatest number of seats in the HoPR shall 
form the executive and lead it. The legislative organs are constitutionally declared to be the highest political 
authority, empowered with the most important function, law/policymaking. 
To summarize, this chapter assesses and explores various theoretical perspectives on systems of 
government and public policymaking process. It has set the background information on the meaning/concept of 
public policy, the theories, the actors and their powers in different typologies of public policymaking process. 
Public policymaking theories are used to simplify our thinking about public policy and to channel our efforts to 
understand public policy by way of distinguishing between what is important and not important.  
Moreover the characteristics of the two prominent forms of government presidential and parliamentary; 
separation of power and the relationship between different branches of government in both forms of government; 
are also included to investigate the practice in which public policy are made in the existing Ethiopian parliament. 
The basic control is vested to the three branches of a government, in three separate and independent institutions, 
the legislature, the executive and the courts, with the personnel of each being independent to each other. Scholars 
noted that not all government powers can neatly slotted in to just one of these categories as the pure doctrine 
assumes to be the case. The inadequacy of this classification has become more obvious in recent times 
particularly in parliamentary countries in relation to at least two areas of government activity: legislation and 
policy making. Both these processes occur in all three branches of government and how they fit in to the doctrine 
of separation of powers is still being resolved.  
Furthermore the chapter discussed the link of legislatures with citizens and civil society organization 
and found that legislatures should involve citizens and civil society organizations to a say to policies affecting 
their community using different mechanisms. Policy makers are in charge of developing policies in such a way 
that the outcome of which can bring a real benefit to the society. All these can happen when nationals have the 
right to participate in national development and in particular to be consulted with respect to policies or laws 
affecting them. With weak participation of the citizen, policies will lose the ownership of citizen which is a 
crucial element to their effective implementation.  
Moreover discussions are also made on the legal and institutional preconditions of legislature for public 
policy formulation based on the experience of different parliamentarian countries. Number of house, 
constitutional power, capacity of legislature, legislative organizations, and political space and political will are 
identified as a fundamental structure and institutional factors that obstruct or enhance the effort of legislature in 
its policymaking functions. Different experience revealed that, in the absence of professionally advanced and 
qualified support staff, independent policy thinks-thank and policy advocacy institutions, it will be difficult for 
the legislature to professionalize policies.  
 
Research Design and Methodology of The Study 
This chapter describes the methods by which the questions raised within the study analyzed. The research design, 
source of data, population, sampling, data instruments and data analysis method are explained here under.  
 
Research Design 
This research employed descriptive and analytical research methods to describe, in detail, a situation or set of 
circumstances of the current status of the legislature and their policymaking role; to describe "what exists" and 
the status quo with respect to variables of the policymaking process and institutional capacity of legislature in 
contemporary Ethiopia. This research is largely qualitative, which is appropriate to collect subjective opinion 
from members of legislature, members of standing committee and administrative staff of the house about their 
roles, power, practice and challenges that they are exercising in the policy making process. However to a lesser 
extent, the quantitative method was also applied to obtain the preliminary information and demographic 
characteristics of the sample population. Because of the dominant qualitative nature of the study, the research is 
relied on open-ended questionnaire in depth interviews, observation and document review. Finally, empirical 
evidences collected through questionnaire, interview and document review are organized by respondents, 
analyzed and summarized.   
 
Population  
Since the study intended to explore the practice and challenges of legislative organ, members of the parliament, 
members of the standing committees and the administrative staff of the House of Representatives were the 
population of the study from which the sample drawn. Moreover some key informants involved in the 
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Sampling Technique  
For the reason that is because the research focuses on the practice and challenges of the legislature in 
policymaking process, both probability and a non-probability sampling technique were employed. From 
probability sampling simple random sampling is applied to draw a sample from all members of parliament 
except the opposition representative. Moreover, purposive sampling method is used to include the opposition MP 
and to gather incisive information from, chairman and secretary of the standing committees, administrative staff, 
and from the key informants such as from Civil Society Organization, Prime Minister Office, former parliament 
members and Academics (on policy studies, federalism and law).  
 
Sample Size 
The main respondents of the research were members of the House of Peoples Representative (HoPRs). From the 
members of HoPRs, 88 (12%)  have been selected including eight members of parliament from Allied Parties to 
the EPRDF, one from opposition parties, 20 respondents from chair persons and secretary of the standing 
committees. Of the respondents of MPs’ 20(22.7%) were women MPs’. Moreover six administrative staff of the 
HoPR was selected from the legal drafting, research and oversight support directorate. Finally, two experts from 
PMO, five from Ethiopian academics, six from civil society organization and two former MPs were selected as 
respondents whose information is used to substantiate the data obtained from the members of HoPR. Table 3 
shows the sampling frame and size of the study. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Sample Respondents 
Sampling Frame Total Population Sample size in No 
F M Total F M Total 
Members of Parliament excluding  
Members from opposition parties,  
chairman and secretary of the standing 
committee 
146 324 470 16  42 58 
Member of Opposition Party - 1 1 - 1 1 
Members of parliament from Allied 
Parties to the EPRDF  
3 40 43 2 6 8 
Chairman and secretary of the standing 
committees 
3 29 32 2 18 20 
Total Members of Parliament 152 395 547 20 68 87 
House of Peoples Representative Administrative staff (legal drafting, 
research and oversight professional support staff) 
- 6 6 
Key informants from House of Federation, Prime Minister Office, Civil 
Society Organizations,  Former Members of Parliament and Academics 
- 15 15 
Total 108 
 
Sources of Data  
• Primary Data Source: Since the research concentrated mainly on the policymaking role of legislature 
from agenda setting to policy adoption stage of the policymaking process, it has used primary sources of 
data, questionnaire and interview to gather the opinion and insight of the selected respondents on their 
role.  
• Secondary Data Source: In addition to primary sources, secondary data were collected to substantiate 
interview and questionnaire responses, the researcher has made a detailed and an extensive review of past 
documents. The proclamations and regulations have been collected and examined to explore the power 
vested on the legislative body, the procedures and systems established for policymaking process, and to 
relate past and current policymaking practices of legislative institutions. 
 
Data Collection Instruments 
1. Questionnaire: Four questionnaires that comprise both open and closed-ended questions were prepared 
and distributed to the members of parliament, members of standing committee, administrative staff of the 
House and key informants to collect more facts and detail opinions of the respondents. The questionnaire 
distributed to members of parliament has five parts. In the first part respondents were asked to complete 
personal information. The second part focuses on the organization and procedures and rules of parliament. 
The third part contains questions that are devoted to ask respondents on their power, role and practice in 
the policy initiation, formulation and legitimating process. The fourth part deals with the relationship of 
legislature with different policy actors, while the fifth part focuses on the institutional capacity of 
legislature. Similarly, the questionnaire distributed for standing committee members consist the above 
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type of questions in addition to questions based on their role provided by the procedure of the House such 
as initiating, drafting legislations, and organizing public hearings.  The other questionnaire filled by the 
administrative staff of the House center on their support to the legislature in policymaking process and 
their insight on the policymaking practice of the parliament. Finally the questionnaire distributed to the 
key informants stresses on the system of government, their insight on the role and practice of the existing 
parliament and, the participation of the people, civil society organizations, think-tank groups, and research 
institute, in the policymaking process. Amharic language is used to collect questionnaire responses 
particularly from the MPs’, members of standing committees and administrative staff of the House.  
2. Interview: Interviews (both structure and unstructured) were conducted with the two Chairpersons of 
standing committee’s in the HoPRs. Interviews are used specially to triangulate the information obtained 
through the questionnaires and to gather detailed information on legislature relationship with other policy 
actors, on their powers, roles, capacity as well as actual practices during the policymaking process. 
Interviews were tape-recorded, this provided the researcher with opportunity to go through the tapes and 
transcribe them for careful analysis. 
3. Observation: Moreover observations were conducted to survey some of the deliberations of public 
hearings on draft legislation.  
 
Method of Data Analysis 
The questionnaire was randomly distributed based on the sample size and in total 108 MPs responded to the 
questionnaire. The analysis made based on the information and empirical evidences collected through 
questionnaire, interviews and document review. Because of the qualitative nature of the study, thematic analyses 
were used dominantly in the discussions based on the information obtained from open ended questions, 
interviews and reviewed documents and attempts were made to include the views of different groups. 
 
Data Presentation, Discussion and Analysis 
This chapter puts forward the presentation, discussion and analysis of the data/information secured from 
respondents and document reviewed. Questionnaire and interview responses from Members of the Parliament, 
(Ruling party-EPRDF MPs, EPRDF allied party MPs’, Opposition MP), chairman and secretary of standing 
committee, and from key informants (civil society organizations leader, Prime Minister Office experts, former 
parliament members and academics) are used as sources for data presentation, discussion and analysis. Table 4 
below shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The FDRE Constitution, the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives of the FDRE Rules of Procedures and Members’ Code of Conduct Regulation No. 3/2006 and 
the minutes of lawmaking and public hearing session of HoPRs on draft Proclamations and other documents 
were reviewed for analysis.  
 
Table: 4 Characteristics of the Respondents 
 
Source: Survey data 
 
Questionnaires were designed and distributed to MPs’, standing committees’, administrative staff of the House 
and key informants. Out of the total 115 questionnaires distributed, 109 respondents filled and returned. From 
the entire respondents 88(81%) were male and 21(19%) were female. Concerning their party representation, the 
profile of the respondents include: 79 from ruling party MPs’, 8 from Allied Parties to the EPRDF, and one from 
opposition parties. Moreover, 20 chair persons and secretaries of the standing committees, six administrative 
staff of the HoPR and 15 key informants (2 from PMO, 8 from Ethiopian academics, 6 from civil society 
organizations, and 2 former MPs) were also included. The educational profile of respondents shows: 4 (4%) PhD 
holders, 51 (47%) Masters, 31 (28%) Bachelor, and the remaining 21 (20%) are Diploma holder.  
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The Law/Policymaking Power, Role and Function of the HoPR  
Modern democracies are characterized by shared decision-making between the legislative and executive 
branches. Most policy initiatives are enacted into law, and thus must be approved by the legislature. It becomes 
very important then to identify what exactly the contribution of the legislature is to the overall policy-making 
process; to assess how well does the legislature performs its policymaking function  granted to it by the 
constitution, other laws and in light of certain policymaking theories and principles. 
 
The Law/Policymaking Power of the HoPR 
The FDRE Constitution, the HoPR Rules of Procedures and Members’ Code of Conduct Regulation No. 3/2006 
and the minutes of public hearing sessions of HoPR on the draft Proclamations and several comments (as 
described below) have been gathered through interview and questionnaire responses to assess the policy making 
role of the legislature in Ethiopia. In modern democracy, the powers and functions of the three organs of the 
government are identified and enumerated in the Constitution and other legislations. This is important to 
determine the power limit of the government organs to hold them accountable and to make them liable based on 
the scope of their authority.  
Based on the FDRE Constitution Article (53), Ethiopia follows a bicameral Parliamentary system of 
government that has two federal houses called the Lower House-‘House of Peoples’ Representatives’ and the 
Upper House-‘House of the Federation’.  Bicameralism is the practice of having two legislative or parliamentary 
chambers. However, the relationship between the two chambers of a bicameral legislature can vary from country 
to country.  In most parliamentary countries, the power of the legislative is vested to both houses. The 
constitutions grant both Parliaments the power to introduce legislation directly and to enact new legislation while 
in others legislators can only consider proposals originated in the executive.  
In this regard, the constitution of Ethiopia has vested full power of legislation on the lower house, 
HoPR. As enshrined in the FDRE Constitution Article (55 & 93), the house is vested with the power to legislate 
and enact laws. Legislation is, therefore, to prescribe rules and power of execution and the executive is 
subordinate and accountable to the Legislature. As the body that represents the people, HoPR is called upon to 
see to it that the administration of public policy reflects and meets the people’s needs.  
Unlike other bicameral countries, the role of the Upper House-HoF in the lawmaking process is limited 
to such specific matters as amending the constitution, and initiating draft civil laws, (it merely identifies, but not 
legislate civil matters) to be enacted by the HoPR (Article 62,8). The House of Federation was meant to be a 
counter-majoritarian institution to balance against the majoritarianism in the HoPR and to protect minorities that 
could be left defenseless in the face of infant democracy. However, it is criticized that it barely could serve as a 
protection since the law-making function is not vested to the House and its composition replicates the situation in 
the HoPR that the numerically dominant ethnic groups, which dominate HoPR dominate the HoF as well 
(Tsegaye, 2004). Therefore, this arrangement distinguishes Ethiopia from most bicameral parliamentary 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa, which grant the Upper House the power of 
law/policymaking and approval. For instance, the Canadian Senate enjoys the power of legislation in much the 
same manner as the House of Lords in UK and the Council of Province of the South African Parliament.  
Some academics also commented that this arrangement  has an impact on the policymaking process 
because the states will be left without option, which means that, unlike those federal countries, such as for 
instance, Germany whose Landers are directly involved in the law making process so that the Landers could 
override the decision of the lower house by exercising Veto or suspension power; the states in Ethiopia lacked 
this quality as they are not represented in the upper house; and the House itself has almost little law making 
power. Hence, if bicameralism is measured in terms of the law-making power of the Houses, some researchers 
tend to argue that Ethiopia has a de facto unicameral parliament as the upper house which represents diversities 
is denied the power to make laws (Legese, 2012). 
Although it is subject to argument that having a bicameral legislature makes meaningful political 
reforms more difficult to achieve, and increases the risk of deadlock (particularly in cases when both chambers 
have equal powers), most political analysts agree strongly for the merits of the checks and balances that are 
provided by the bicameral model (Rogers, 2001). In the case of Ethiopia, most of key informants who are 
academia agreed that, although the HoF assumes significant political power, lack of policymaking power is an 
impediment for the constituent units to exercise shared rule at the federal level.  
Although the HOF is given the most important power to interpret the FDRE Constitution, as a structure, 
bicameralism in Ethiopia has no contribution to yield better policy by providing more information to policy 
makers and checking the tendency to mould legislation in line with popular pressures; and to prevent ill-
considered  legislation from being passed into law.  
The constitution of Ethiopia also grants the power to enact new laws/policies to the executive by decree.  
Apart from the power of executing and implementing policies  the Council of Minister and his Cabinet is offered 
the power of formulating economic, social and development policies and strategies as well as foreign policies 
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(Article 77:6). The council is also responsible to submit a draft law to the HoPR on any matters falling within its 
competence (Article 77:11). 
Apart from this, as per the provisions of the Constitution Article 55 (1) and 59(2), which empower the 
HoPR to make its own rules of procedure and law making procedure, the House enacted Regulation No.3/2006, 
the Working Procedure and Members Code of Conduct Regulation. This Regulation was enacted because it is 
important to enable the HoPR to effectively discharge its powers and functions as well as the responsibility 
vested with by the public as enshrined in the Constitution, and to organize the working mechanisms and 
structures of the standing and ad hoc committees of the House.  
The HoPR Rules of Procedures and Members’ Code of Conduct Regulation Article (49) grants the 
House the power of legislating new laws, amending or repealing existing laws, ratifying international agreements 
and approval of laws/policies initiated by the executive and passing resolution. The regulation also sets out the 
principles, procedures, processes and practices involved in making acts of Parliament, from inception to 
completion to exercise the powers and duties vested in it by the Constitution; and to discharge the 
responsibilities entrusted to it by the peoples of Ethiopia. 
Thus, pursuant to article 50(1), initiating laws shall be mainly the duty of the government. 
Notwithstanding article 50(1), the regulation also stipulated power to initiate draft law for members of the house, 
Committee, Parliament Groups, and other bodies authorized by law where as the power of initiating finance draft 
laws is vested only on the government.  
Moreover, a proclamation to provide for definitions of powers and duties of the executive organs of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 691/2010 (Article 10:1) empowered each ministry to 
initiate or formulate laws and policies. Apart from this Proclamations enacted by the Parliament on a particular 
area of interest usually contains provision which delegates the executive to enact law by clearly stipulating that 
the Council of Ministers may issue regulations necessary for the proper implementation of the Proclamation.  
Presumably in most parliamentary countries, the constitutions of Ethiopia and other statutory rules 
permit parliaments to delegate the legislative powers to the executive bodies. In Countries like Great Britain 
according to the principle of the parliamentary sovereignty all legislative powers are concentrated in the 
parliament but the executive bodies may adopt laws only on the basis of the powers delegated by the parliament 
(Kumarasingham, 2012).  Nonetheless both cases reveal that in most parliamentary governments constitutional 
and statutory provisions have clearly strengthen the leverage of the executive, and policymaking functions tend 
to be concentrated in ministerial bureaucracy or parties. This is what Franchino (2008) describe that parliaments 
involve the delegation of considerable discretion to ministers who are in charge of administering existing 
policies and drafting new legislation within their jurisdiction. Therefore, executive bodies in Ethiopia are 
generally authorized to be the main body to initiate the policy proposals. This depicts that even though MPs’ are 
entitled to introduce legislation, conversely the enormous authority given to the executive to introduce and 
influence the course of legislation is likely to dominate their autonomous. So the issue at stake and of vital 
importance to be studied is how far and with what effects has this arrangement affected the legislatures and 
policymaking process?   
 
The Structure of the Committees in HoPR 
The General organizational set-up of the HoPR comprises the general assembly of the house, office of the 
speaker, various committees, secretariat of the house; sergeant-at-arms of the house, and party whips 
(parliamentary-group). The major structure that the House uses in performing its law making and oversight 
function is through establishments of committees in the parliament. Likely, in many other countries, 
parliamentary committees in HoPRs take the lion’s share in assisting the parliament to conduct its 
law/policymaking and oversight functions. As per the provision of the Constitution Article 55 (19), the HoPRs 
established different standing and ad hoc committee structures (Regulation No.3/2006, Article 135). These are: 
the House’s Business Advisory Committee, the Coordinating Committee, Standing Committees, Sub-
Committees, and ad hoc Committees, friendship committees and Party Whips.  
Similar to most legislative bodies, the Standing Committees in HoPR are the workhorses and the key 
clearance points at which decisions are taken at each stage of the legislative process. The HoPRs had sixteen 
standing committees, and each Standing Committee shall have up to 20 members. The members of each 
Standing Committee, including the chairperson and the deputy chairperson are assigned based upon the 
recommendation of the Speaker and elected by the House from among members; and no person may be a 
member of more than one Standing Committee (Article, 149).  Therefore the sixteen standing committees 
constitute 320 of the 547 MPs’. As is most countries these committees mirror the government administrative 
structure.  
Pursuant to the regulation, (Article 150) the Standing Committees’ are charged with legislative duties 
and oversight functions over the executive ministries and government institutions to follow up the 
implementation on national socio-economic policies and strategies. They are responsible to submit reports and 
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proposals after examining draft laws referred to them; to follow up and supervise Government bodies; to initiate 
laws; to present their suggestion; to examine witnesses and documents; to undertake studies relating to the 
objective for which they are organized; and to prepare various seminars and fora; to exchange ideas acquired 
through experiences. 
Members of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) run all committees and their 
leadership, except for the public accounts which is run by an opposition party member and Pastoralists’ Affairs 
standing committee, whose members are largely drawn from the EPRDF allied parties and which are particularly 
primed for emerging regions such as Somalia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Afar. Besides, member of private 
contender is also authorized as Deputy Chairperson of the Science and Technology Standing Committee. 
Likely in Westminster parliament’s, the trend in Ethiopia shows of course, that the chair of the Public 
Account Committee is from the oppositions so as to increase the accountability on the utilization of resources 
and government expenditure. The House also established sub-committees upon the request of the Standing 
Committee to undertake activities it has been unable to accomplish owing to the heavy workload. The Standing 
Sub-Committees shall be accountable to the pertinent Standing Committees and shall receive directions and 
activities to be carried out in consultation with the Standing Committees, prepare work plans, and submit a report 
and recommendation to the Standing Committee. 
 
The Law/Policymaking Process and the Role and Function of the HoPR 
By virtue of the principle of separation of powers, the body that is entrusted with the law making power at the 
federal level is the HoPRs.  Apparently in most countries, members of the parliament and the committees in the 
parliament in Ethiopia are entitled to introduce legislation. Besides, the Constitution as well as the Regulation of 
the procedure of HoPR No. 3/2006 (Article 50, 1-7) stipulated, initiating laws is mainly the duty of the 
Government. According to the regulation article 50 (4&5), MPs could present a bill on any issue to the House 
provided that they secure endorsement signatures of members; while a bill initiated by the committee shall be 
presented signed by the committee chairperson. A bill initiated by the parliament group should be presented to 
the Speaker in writing signed by the party whip where as the bills initiated by other organs should be signed by 
the head of the institution and introduced to HoPR via the speaker 50 (6&7). Elaborating on the procedures 
article 50 (8), a draft law to be initiated by anybody shall comprise the importance of the draft law, detailed 
contents of the draft law, a document explaining the impact which the draft law will have on the government 
budget if it becomes law, and Amharic and English copies of the draft law should be presented submitted to the 
House of Speaker. However, in most cases the draft is introduced by the Council of Ministers (CoM). Every bill 
introduced in the house, they then go through a number of stages, first reading, second reading, and third reading 
before being passed for presidential assent. Therefore, the following note explains the process by which 
legislation is passed by HoPR. 
A) The Law/policymaking  Process  
The following note, describes the law making processes followed when the executive initiate and presented the 
draft law to the House. Before describing the process of legislation that is intended to be carried out by the house, 
it is imperative to show the process, how laws/policies are initiated and drafted by the executive. The draft law 
initiated by the government should pass through the procedures and modalities spelled out by the Council of 
Minister (CoMs, 2005).  Each ministry requests with a written letter to the CoMs for the specific legislation that 
the ministry tends to propose, and the request will be incorporated into the legislative program in the fiscal year. 
The CoMs forwards this to the president of the Country; the president of the Country incorporates it in the 
annual opening speech of the two Houses along with the purpose, to aware the HoPRs in which issues the CoMs 
is going to produce and submit the bill.  By the year the line Ministry prepares the draft policy with stake holders; 
different governmental bodies and expertise invited to enrich the policy; and all the minutes of the meeting 
reduced in the report form. Then, after the line Ministry sends the draft which it feels final to the CoM. The 
policy unit at CoM scrutinizes the draft policy and refers the matter to standing committee of the CoM for further 
scrutiny, following a first reading of the legislation under consideration.  If the Standing Committee of the CoM 
agrees with the policy it refers the policy to CoMs for approval, if not; the cabinet affairs minister presents it to 
the next CoMs plenary session; and CoMs deliberates on the policy. At all stages of the clearance points that the 
draft legislation passes through, each (i.e. the ministry initiating the law, the legal Affairs Advisory Group, the 
relevant standing committee that the law is referred to, and the CoMs) should make sure that the bill does not 
conflict with the constitution, other laws and the international laws that the country has ratified (ibid). The 
plenary session of the CoMs decides whether a draft bill should be sent to HoPRs or not. If CoMs is dissatisfied 
with the Policy it returns the policy to the line Ministry to incorporate the issues it feels sound. But if is satisfied, 
it forwards to the parliament. Receiving a draft bill, the Speaker of the HoPR presents the general content and 
spirit of the bill, and the draft law shall pass through the three stages of reading to promulgate. The following 
note, therefore, describes the law making processes followed when the Speaker of the House presents the draft 
law to the House according to the regulation No. 3/2006.  
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.5, No.1, 2015 
 
147 
First Reading  
During the first stage of reading (Article, 52) the body that initiated the draft law presented in the agenda shall 
first give a brief explanation as to the content and purpose the draft law. The copies of the draft law shall be 
distributed to the members 48 hours before the session where as in case of emergency the draft shall be presented 
to the House by reading it. After a general debate on the content and purpose of the draft law where the speaker 
is of the opinion that sufficient debate has been conducted or a motion moved is approved to that effect, the draft 
law shall be given a number and referred to the respective committee.  Where matters that should be considered 
jointly happen, it shall be indicated which committee shall play the leading and coordinating role. The Standing 
Committee that the draft bill is referred should contacts the drafters, consults them and organizes public hearings 
to elicit public opinions’. After consultations with the public and the executive, the committee designs the law 
for the second reading. With the exception that where a motion asking the House to pass to the second reading 
without referring the matter to a committee (committees), gets approval, the House may directly pass to the 
second reading and give the necessary decision after deliberation (Article, 52).   
Second Reading  
In the second stage of reading (Article, 53) the daft law shall be deliberated upon in detail. The report and 
recommendation on the draft law prepared by the committee or committees concerned has presented to the 
House, and the draft law shall be deliberated upon in detail on the basis of the report and recommendation. In 
accordance with this Regulation an amendment motion may be introduced on the draft law report or 
recommendation presented. Where the amendment motion submitted receives approval, and where the House 
considers further investigation is required, the draft law may be referred back to the committee or (committees) 
for reconsideration. After the discussion, if the House is of the opinion that sufficient deliberation on the draft 
law has been conducted or not, shall be decided by voting (Article 53).  If the session fails to achieve complete 
deliberations on the draft, the draft law shall be referred back to the committee for reconsideration. Finally, the 
committee shall submit to the House its final report and recommendation for a third reading which brings the 
legislative process to end. 
Third Reading 
During the third stage of reading (Article, 54), the committee (committees) to which the draft law has been 
referred back for reconsideration, shall submit to the House its final report and recommendation. After 
conducting sufficient deliberation on the report and recommendation, the House shall pass its decision. 
According to the regulation, unless the House believes in the urgency of the matter, a committee to which a draft 
law has been referred to shall be allowed at least 20 working days for considering and presenting its 
recommendation. Notwithstanding this provision, the Speaker, taking into consideration the extent and 
complexity of the draft law, may allow the committee additional time (article, 56).  
Adoption of laws  
Lastly the House shall approve the draft law article by article; and shall vote upon the draft law as a whole to 
pass it as a law and passed by a majority vote in accordance with Article 59(1) of the constitution, except some 
decisions such as amending the constitution, approving the state of emergency declared by the government, 
amend the fundamental rights and freedoms that requires two third majority. Following the decision of HoPR to 
enact a law by a majority, it is submitted to the president for signature (Article 57). Unlike most federal countries 
the bill will not be sent to the House of Federation before adoption. The President shall sign a law submitted to 
him within fifteen days. The President’s power of signing with respect to the legislative process could prolong 
the official adoption of legislation only for fifteen days from the day of submission; nevertheless, after that, the 
law takes effect with or without his signature (ibid). The overall process of the policymaking shows that the 
legislative process starts rolling from the premises of the executive; and must be concluded with the seal of 
approval in the parliament. Presumably, a draft law presented by the members of the House or committee also 
follows the above process of the three readings.  
b) Law/Policymaking Role and Function of the HoPR  
As described above, the members of the house as well as Standing Committees are empowered to initiate laws; 
to examine witnesses and documents; to submit reports and proposals after examining draft laws referred to them 
and to present their suggestion. The Standing committees are autonomous not only that all referred legislation 
should be considered by the referral committee, but they are also required to present their consideration in report 
to the floor.  
Unless the law that needs to be in effect is urgent as it is stipulated in the constitution article 77(10), any 
draft bills proposed and submitted to the house is subject to referral. The index of laws that are previously 
approved shows that except some loan agreements that are conducted with different countries, all bills are 
referred to the respective standing committees for consideration after the first reading are held by the house. If 
the bill requires multiple committees it will be under scrutiny at a joint Sitting of different Standing Committees; 
and the debate will be conducted by the Chairperson of the Standing Committee that co-ordinates the case 
(Regulation No. 3/2006, Article 152).  
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The committee is required to debate with source persons on the draft law, to set up public forums and 
gather the opinion thereof, to cause the stakeholders concerned to give their opinion on the draft law, to cause 
invited guests to be called, according to the circumstances (Article 153). Based on the procedure, the standing 
committees in HoPR first review the document and conduct an overall research with the technical expertise 
support in the respective legal research teams before inviting the source persons and debate on the draft bill. 
After having the debate in technical hearing with the source persons, the committees publicize their sitting 
programs to the public using Ethiopian radio, and television, according to the circumstances. They also write a 
letter attached with the document for relevant organizations before ten days and are holding public hearings on 
legislation referred to them.  
They also facilitate a means by which those who have not been able to attend the sitting bodies and 
individuals can give their opinion on the agendas. More importantly the committees must be able to collect 
independent information about issues and topics related to the legislation before them. Any member has the right 
to attend any sitting prepared by a Standing Committee without the right to vote. 
However, all the bills may not be subject to public hearings, whether they require the public hearing or 
not is decided by a committee. The procedure also allows the Standing Committee to influence the legislation 
content; it allows returning the draft to the body concerned in order to correct and sending it back to the 
committee if the committee is of the opinion that the draft law referred to it has a fundamental problem, after 
informing the speaker about the case (Article 153, 9). The procedure gives the committee a range of options in 
shaping legislation such as: amendment, rejection, referral back to executive branch. Moreover, the committee’s 
position is protected by the floor in the final reading. This attests that the legislatures have the legal ground to 
play a significant role in scrutinizing whether the laws/policies are proposed on the benefit of the people before 
they gets an approval.  
Indeed, the constitution as well as the procedure of HoPR has given significant power of 
law/policymaking to members, and committees of HoPR. Members of parliament and the standing committees 
also clearly explained through the questionnaires that they are well aware of their power and the procedures to 
initiate the law, and there is no any procedural hindrance to discharge their responsibility of initiating the law. 
However, they noted their involvement in proposing the law/policy agenda is negligible, while they ranked the 
executive and ruling party first interchangeably. All of the responses of the MPs explicate that the reason they 
holdup to initiate law is, for one thing, they understand that the task of the legislature is to promulgate the 
policies proposed by the executive and to oversee their implementation; they rather mull over themselves only to 
approve detailed legislation/proclamation than as  formulators. Secondly, they believe the ability of the MPs’ is 
not as such competent compared with the executive to propose well-informed policy ideas. Moreover, they 
strongly believe that the executive shall provide legal support or complement the loophole in the law through 
legislation since it has an access to identify where the issue that needs policy emanates from during 
implementation. Besides, the opposition MP mentioned that the precondition seated by the regulation of HoPRs 
‘A draft law initiated by members of the parliament shall be presented to the speaker in writing signed by at least 
twenty members’ prevents opposition political parties to initiate alternative policy proposals. According to him, 
the ruling party enjoys an absolute power in the process of policy making that involves both agenda setting and 
designing policy proposal.  
The chair person at the standing committee with different rationalization, strongly believes that as far as 
the government is constructed from the ruling party that has got the largest number of seats in the parliament, 
and once the policies and strategies of the ruling party has got the acceptance of the public through election, the 
responsibility of initiating the laws should rely on the shoulder of the government. According to him the 
legislature is mostly responsible to review and approve the policies on behalf of the public in the policymaking 
process. Consequently, the draft law initiated by the executive scrutinized and reviewed based on the inputs as a 
desired level before promulgation, said the chair person. However some professional’s claim that the Ethiopian 
parliament is used to rubberstamp the laws, he noted, this is not only the case of Ethiopia rather the reality of all 
parliamentary countries.  
The academicians on their part argued that having the power by decree with its strategic position of 
resources and the competence towards policymaking, the executive secured much authority to introduce and 
influence the course of legislation. They also claim that the ruling party is not successful in representing itself 
with best parliamentarians as much as it reserves its best members in the executive branch; it lacks competent 
candidates that can ensure its supremacy over the executive.  Moreover, they noted that except some attempts 
made by the opposition and private MPs contenders, to identify gaps in the legislation and in some cases have 
boycotted Parliament in protest at the passage of a particular piece of legislation, most legislative proposals are 
approved smoothly. Therefore, such circumstance makes the HoPRs to be perceived as an institution that simply 
endorses the initiation from the executive. Table 5 below shows the law/policymaking trend of HoPR. 
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Table 5: The law/policymaking trend of HoPRs   
Year Bills 
proposed/initiated 
by the legislature 
Bills proposed 
/initiated by the 
executive 
Bills approved by 
legislature 
 No % No % No % 
1st term 1995/96-2000 8 3.6% 209 96.3% 217 100% 
2nd term 2000/01-2005 3 1.2% 251 98.8% 254 100% 
3rd term 2006-2010 2  0.9% 222 99.1% 224 100% 
4th term 2011-March, 2013 - 0 84 98.8% 84 100% 
Total 13 1.6% 766 98.3% 779 100% 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the minutes and archives in the HoPR 
As it is shown in the above table, the trend of the law/policymaking is entirely dominated by the 
executive branch, while the HoPR is playing the role of arbiters and approval of policy. The reviewed documents 
testify that up until March 2013, the executive proposed 766 (98.3%) bills while the office of the House Speaker 
proposed the remaining 13 (1.6%) bills. In the four terms of the Ethiopian Parliament there are only two laws 
(proclamation of National Anthem (673/2010) and the proclamation of national flag (651/2010) that are initiated 
by information and culture affairs standing committee. Despite the fact that the executive sent a preponderant 
number of the bills, the success rate of the bills initiated by the Executive is high. All the proposed bills have 
been approved.   
Both the data gathered from the documents and through the questionnaires revealed that almost all the 
laws/policies passed by Parliament have originated from the Executive; the legislatures were engaged in  
reviewing and approving legislation. This situation depicts that though the Constitution has given the far 
reaching powers of law making and mandates to the HoPRs, as it is described by Robert & John (1999) strong 
formal powers do not guarantee an influential legislature; formal powers mean little if a legislature lacks the 
capacity to use them. This can be seen as justified by Howlett and Ramesh (2003) that in parliamentary systems 
where the legislators belonging to the governing party and where the membership is tightly organized along 
party lines, and marked by a high degree of cohesion and discipline, permit little opportunity for legislators to 
take an independent stand.  
More importantly, all respondents from MPs’ stated that beside the executive branch,  the party 
ideology and its leadership  has played an important role in public policymaking as much rests on constitutional 
guarantees as on the majority seats in the parliament shall form the executive and lead it (Article 56). Therefore 
the MPs firmly expressed that the party and the executive is acting accordingly and there is no wrong in this 
exercise as long as people at various levels are involved in the formulation of policies and plans in an organized 
manner and as long as the trend has no negative impact. Moreover, some MPs’ are justifying that in countries 
such as Ethiopia, where democracy is at its infant stage, where citizens and civil society organizations are not 
vibrant, and where pluralistic political culture and opposition parties are not strong, the system is likely to 
promote the exclusive power of the executive and party leadership.  
Despite the aforementioned justification raised by MPs,’ the academicians, and former MPs’ justify 
through the questionnaires that from the constitutional point of view, there is an ample opportunity for the 
legislature to disclose their responsibilities as it is a venture for realizing policy legitimacy. However, in practice 
the dominance of the executive/ruling party is narrowing the political space obstructing each organ of the 
government to function well and is simply a monopoly in contradiction with the separation of power that 
stipulates check and balance. According to them, the power of the legislature to override the draft policy 
negotiated by the executive, shows in practice the former loss of its power as there is fusion of power between 
the executive and legislature. Even if the option is minimal, in the situation where a single party occupies over 
98% of the seats in the Parliament, in a situation where Ethiopia lacks the oppositions (to put as they explained, 
the ‘unpaid researchers’ for the government in power, and individual MPs’ are not competent to counter-balance 
and challenge the policy ideas proposed by the executive. They strongly remarked that the policymaking process 
lacks wide spread policy deliberation. Hence, the dominant party controls over the political process, there is a 
high possibility for it to be passed for a draft law once negotiated by the executive.  
The chair person of the standing committee also stated that capable and loyal opposition parties (in his 
expression loyal to the constitution and to the public) have a significant contribution especially to raise 
alternative policy ideas and to make the executive attentive to self correct. However, lacking such type of 
opposition parties in parliament is not by far better than one party dominated parliament. Comparing the third 
term of the parliament with the existing one, he remarked that however the oppositions are absent in the existing 
parliament, its capacity is in a better position than the third term on which opposition were more.  
An opposition MP on his part noted:  
The Constitution has been plainly stipulated the application of balance of power between the three 
wings of the government. However, in Ethiopia where almost all the executives are members of the 
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ruling party and members of the parliament; and where party and the government are not clearly 
separated; there is a favorable ground to the executive through the majority seat to legislates whatever 
it wants. The Parliament lacks a pluralistic approach; neither the alternative ideas presented by 
opposition are accepted nor members of ruling party challenged the issues proposed by the ruling party. 
The loyalty of the ruling party members goes even to the extent of believing that challenging the 
government in parliament is counted as to the breach of party discipline, and to the extent of being 
committed to give priority to party concerns than addressing the problems of the people who elect them. 
As such, no challenge comes from MPs, and as a result of which the leading executive encounters no 
obstacle in having ratified whatever draft laws it submits to the House (translated by the researcher). 
He also stated that unless fair election is carried out, and the government let itself free from political 
corruption, multi-party system enriched and the participation of parties in the assembly developed, the 
opposition are be able to discharge its duties and alternative ideas provided by these parties are recognized, the 
parliament will have no option except to serve as a rubber stamp. 
Mulugeta (2005) also describes explicitly that the ruling party-fused-executive leadership emerged as 
disproportionately dominant in the policymaking process and the effort that they have been exerting on initiating, 
influencing and legitimizing policies circumscribed the potential contributions of the legislatures.   
From the above discussion it is understood that the strong ties between the two organs of government 
creates more trust, than engagement of legislature to their institution; permit little opportunity for legislators to 
take an independent stand and this in turn down the participation of the legislature to approval of legislation on 
narrow terms. This is certainly the case of all parliamentarian governments that a fusion of powers, paradoxically, 
is the power it gives to the executive, not the legislative, arm of government. If the majority is made up of 
members of his /her own party, the head of government can use these supporters to control the legislature's 
business, thus protecting the executive from being truly accountable and at the same time passing any laws 
which are expedient for the government. A revolt by members of the government's own party is possible, but 
party discipline along with a tendency by many MPs to maintain their position for the next election makes such a 
revolt unsatisfactory. 
In addition, in Ethiopia, the limited involvement of the opposition parties, the dominance of a ruling 
party in all government institutions reduced the willingness and the capacity of legislature to counter balance and 
challenge the action of the executive. As can be shown below in table 6 except in the 3rd term the trend of 
participation of opposition parties in HoPR is insignificant in the Ethiopian parliament. This may decrease the 
chance of the legislature to become an independent legislative decision making institution and to become an 
arena in which to criticize the government. When government rules without opposition partners, the tightness of 
the relationship between the members of the core executive which usually also at the same time be members of 
parliament and the capacity of the dominant party’s leaders to control outcomes, will be at its maximum (Lane 
and Narud 1994).  
 
Table 6: Party Composition in HoPRs in the Four Parliamentary Terms 
 
Source: the HoPRs Archives 
Not only in Ethiopia, but globally also where parliamentary institutions and the executives are 
controlled and enrolled only by the member of ruling party, the latter will have an access to dominate the 
legislature and could monopolize the lawmaking process to promote its party’s economic and social interests. 
Firstly, this can also be justified by the fact that, parliament is not only unable to represents citizens, but it is also 
unable to represents them collectively to promote certain broad policy tendencies. Parties serve not only to 
secure choice of votes, but also to ensure that these choices are carried out through into the work of parliament 
and into ongoing public debate. Secondly, since parliamentary system allows the house to organize the whipping 
system, it is obvious that party and the executive will have the lion’s share in policymaking arenas. For instance 
in the UK House of Commons (the Whipping System), Whips have an important role in keeping MPs informed 
of forthcoming parliamentary business and maintaining the party's voting strength by ensuring members attend 
important debates and support their party in parliamentary divisions. This is what, Giliomee, et.al. (2001) write 
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that ostensible authority resides in the constitution, parliament and cabinet, but real authority and decision 
making occurs outside of formal constitutional structures such as Parliament and instead policies are conducted 
behind the closed doors of party forum.  
Moreover, as it is noted in chapter two, in the Westminster-United Kingdom and the Japanese, the key 
feature of the legislative process is strongly controlled by the government, and the bigger the government’s 
majority, the greater the government’s control. Most legislation is initiated by the government and MPs of the 
party in power have relatively little scope to influence its content. Through the system of Whips, MPs who 
enforce party discipline, they are required to support their party line on almost all important legislative decisions. 
There are, however, some notable exceptions like Sweden which stands out as example of active legislatures. In 
Sweden, assembly members are mainly grouped in constituency, rather than party blocks, consequently private 
members’ proposals they called (motioner) are ten times as numerous as government bills (Denis and Ian, 1989).  
Presumably in Westminster-United Kingdom, the regulation of the HoPR (Article, 185) offered the 
government whips assigned by a ruling party to inform members of their party in the parliament about agendas 
of the House beforehand to cause their members to attend sittings and vote for their party. Consequently, MPs 
are considered to vote in accordance to the structure of their party for one thing that is their belief, if not to keep 
themselves in office through redeployment.  
In light of policymaking theories, the above discussions vividly show that the Ethiopian parliamentary 
system has put the formal and legal aspect of governmental institutions that dictates policy to be authoritatively 
determined, legitimated and implemented. Nevertheless, the examination of the relationship of these institutions 
and empirical data show policymaking in Ethiopia are dominated by the preference of the elites from the 
executives/ruling party. Both the ruling party and the executive are decisive in determining policies as they are 
responsible to propose policies and to determine the nature of institutions to implement policies. As described in 
the literature, in the context of developing countries, the primary source of power for the policy elites is highly 
the wielding of political offices and agencies (Anderson, 2003). As a result both the political and bureaucratic 
elite fashion mass opinion than masses shaping the leaderships views (Saasa, 1985). However, although 
institutional structures arrangements and procedures often have important consequences for the adoption and 
content of public policies that provide part of the context for policymaking; the interests of governing elite 
preferences are carried into effect by bureaucratic agencies. This depicts that the Elite theory is dominating the 
policymaking process in Ethiopia. 
In addition to the criticism mentioned on the competence of the legislature, and as revealed by 
Franchino (2008), being the parliamentary government, legislature in Ethiopia  enjoys  the delegation of 
considerable discretion to executive who are in charge of administering existing policies and drafting new 
legislation within their jurisdiction. To the researcher’s view, in the case of Ethiopia two facts should also be 
recognized. Firstly, the past history of the country where development, peace and democracy where denied and 
became a question of survival to continue as a sovereign country, it is obvious that the option of the government 
as well as the ruling party has to balance and appreciate such type of arrangement to reduce policy gridlocks, to 
run its policies and programs easily, and to ensure stability and continuity in governance. 
Secondly, with the reality that round-table political debate tradition were not developed as a culture and 
the participation of the opposition party is somewhat weak, it gives outright passage of policies designed and 
presented to the parliament by the ruling party. Hence, unless the political competition culture is enriched, 
legislative authority formally rests to the Parliament, will be reduced to mere approval of bills drafted by the 
dominant party led executive. However, it may also be argued that this could be compensated by greater 
participation of the people in the formulation of policies and plans in an organized manner. Moreover, governing 
parties need to recognize that an effective and responsible opposition is essential for the success of the 
functioning of parliamentary political systems since genuine political opposition is a necessary attribute of 
democracy, tolerance, and trust in the ability of citizens to resolve differences by peaceful means.   
Legislature - Executive Relationship in the Law/Policymaking Process 
As it is described in the foregoing parts, enormous policymaking power is vested on the executive. The executive 
is overwhelming possessing both the power of initiating and implementing policies whereas the legislature is 
limited with the power of approving policies. Therefore,  the question that should be posed here is how the 
Ethiopian legislature, as a body that represents the people, reflects and meets the needs of the people; and how 
the separation of power is between the legislature and executive can be maintained in Ethiopian parliamentary 
system.  
The Constitution article (55, 17) has offered the HoPR to call and question the Prime Minister and other 
federal officials and to investigate the executive’s conduct and discharge of its responsibilities. Accordingly, the 
Prime Minister should present reports regarding the general operation of the government to the House 
periodically (Article 74, 11). The HoPR has the power, at the request of one-third of its members, to discuss any 
matter pertaining to the powers of the executive, and to take decisions or measures it deems necessary. Moreover, 
the HoPR has set mechanisms and procedures that enable the MP’s to oversee the activities and performance of 
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the executives (Regulation No. 3/2006). According to the regulation the House shall supervise and follow up the 
implementation and the direction of the national polices, strategies, plans, laws and operations towards 
advancing the country’s development, observing the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, and ensuring 
the proper implementation of the budget and resources of the federal government 74 (1). The House is also 
empowered not only to cause a given governmental office to recognize its problem and give it directives to 
correct its weakness but also to cause a measure to be taken through the Prime Minster on the body responsible 
for the problem, where the problem is not corrected and where it is serious. Moreover the house is responsible to 
take the necessary measures where problems are created by institutions directly accountable to the House though 
the Constitution does not enumerate what kinds of measures that the House may take. More importantly, the 
Legislature holds the power to approve the budget when it is submitted to it by the executive organ. This 
indirectly has the effect of entailing a power to the Legislature there by finishing a valid ground for the 
Legislature to oversee the activities of the executive body. Hence, the House has the power to conduct effective 
oversight over the executive action. 
The MP’s also strongly believe that the principle of separation of power in Ethiopia can be maintained 
during the approval and after the enactment of the policy or the law. The engagement of members as well as the 
several standing committees in the scrutiny of law and oversight function, (listen to and evaluate the report by 
the executive, provide feedback to the executive, and visit different entities) is to evaluate the implementation of 
policies. In doing so, however, the MPs mentioned that lack of technical knowledge, resources both financial and 
expertise to consult them, are hindering the task of parliamentary field works to carry out oversight.  
The Chairperson of the standing committee also promotes the above idea. Since the Ethiopian 
parliament is at infant stage, the members and the institution itself lacks the capacity to use the power given, 
particularly to challenge the executive which has triple powers: (party power, government power and resource 
power), and is in a better position with a well established institution, in expertise, knowledge and experience, the 
parliament are not seen in debating and challenging the executive; as the effort to substitute bills, or initiate laws 
are aborted.  
On their part, the key informants from the academics and civil society’s argued that since the party 
which controls both the legislature and the executive plays a significant role in policy process, check and balance 
seems very weak in the Ethiopian parliamentary context. They also noted that even though the instances of 
parliaments to oversight the implementation of executives is contributing to some extent to keep the check and 
balance between the two organs of government, it cannot be a guarantee since the executive prevails in its 
capacity; it is difficult for ordinary MPs to challenge their party chiefs sitting in the executive for fear of reprisal 
and breach of party discipline. According to them, this starkly makes the role of the oversight to be no more than 
a nominal gesture that does not result in to even a minimum itch to the executive other than serving as media 
consumption. Therefore, the balance between the two remains lop-sided and this is the apparent missing-link in 
Ethiopia.  
A study conducted on the parliamentary oversight by Awol (2011) also sums up that in all cases, 
political factors and considerations have undermined the role of parliaments as bodies that failed to foster 
mechanisms of checks and balances that are pivotal in checking and controlling the mode of operation of the 
executive. He further noted that the measures that the House may take on the government agencies or organs that 
found to commit a fault, is to be taken through the chief-executive, the regulation empower PM to recommend 
the House the measures that could possibly be taken against those government organs. This situation makes the 
chief-executive to be left unsupervised and unchecked for no one is empowered by the regulation to recommend 
the possible measures that could be taken against the chief-executives (ibid). 
More importantly, however it is subject to debate, what senior academics commented that overseeing is 
naturally not the function of the legislature. They also remarked that these days the Ethiopian Parliament has 
reverted to the activity of overseeing simplistic matters than its central role of debates and dialogues on policy 
and policymaking.  The legislature is shifted to the role of the executive of monitoring and overseeing routines 
and masterminded by the executive.  
Despite the fact that the Great Britain and Australia have a similar structure, the opposition parties are 
so strong that they can counter balance and challenge the actions of the executive. For instance, in the Australian 
system ministers are subject to the scrutiny of other Members of the Parliament led by an officially recognized 
opposition; and the Executive does not necessarily control both Houses of the Parliament (Reynolds, 2011). 
Whereas in Ethiopia, the only committee chaired by the opposition is the Public Accounts Committee, which is 
mandated to oversee the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of government financial management. 
Nonetheless,   the executive enjoys the power overwhelming of initiating policies, legislature has an essential 
power of scrutinizing and approving laws/policies, at the federal levels as well as any kind of agreement made by 
the executive organ with foreign governments.  Moreover parliament is also called upon to ensure that policies 
are properly implemented and delivered to target citizens. In this regard Ethiopia has built-in mechanisms for 
regular questioning of ministers. 
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However, data/information collected from different respondents reveal that, checks and balances 
between the executive and the legislator are not fully maintained in the lawmaking process. For one reason, the 
executive is not separated from the legislative as the members of the government member of the legislative body; 
and for another, the legislative activity of the parliaments has become under control of the government and party.  
As described by John and Robert (1999) the political space, the extent to which executives and parties cede, lose, 
share, exchange or let slip the power they hold is determinant of how much power a legislature can exercise.  
Moreover, MP’s encounter lack of expertise knowledge and a difficulty in getting expert advice and opinion on 
matters that require technocratic skills in specialized knowledge. Indeed the Ethiopian Parliament is less likely to 
develop large expert staff to rival government ministries, and it is less likely to exercise aggressive legislative 
and oversight since its own allies are typically in charge of executive agencies. More importantly, the parliament 
and the executives, as an institution, are not on equal footing since the experience of parliamentary practice in 
Ethiopia is in its lower profile and its institutional capacity is limited compared to the executive which has a long 
history and in a relatively better capacity. In the existing situation, therefore, it seems difficult for the parliament 
to exercise its full constitutional mandates discretely unless the power of the executive is limited. Hence the 
above discussion shows that the effect of being a parliamentary where separation of power is in a more fluid 
situation compounded by insufficient institutional capacity impedes the Ethiopian parliament to maintain 
separation of power and constitutional rule of law for what in developed democracies is characterize as a limited 
government whose role and mandates cannot transgress its constitutional limits. 
Public Participation in the policymaking process of HoPRs 
As it is noted in the theoretical chapter, the role of citizens in a democracy is not limited by the act of electing a 
government; they need to be continually engaged with it if it is to remain in touch with the people and their 
needs. A democratic parliament, for its part, will seek to foster a vibrant civil society and to work closely with it 
in finding solutions to problems facing the country, and in improving the quality and relevance of legislation 
(Beetham, 2006). Citizen participation is the most acceptable root to encourage participatory democracy in the 
hope of making the government more accountable thereby then to obtain the vibrant policy ownerships from the 
public to hasten the implementation of the policies. The Constitution article 43(2) holds that ‘Nationals have the 
right to participate in national development and, in particular, to be consulted with respect to policies and 
projects affecting their community’. This has been further illustrated under article 89 (6), as: ‘Government shall 
at all times promote the participation of the people in the formulation of national development policies and 
programs; it shall also have the duty to support the initiatives of the people in their development endeavors’.  
Hence, the public has been granted the constitutional rights to have their say to policies affecting their 
community. The Parliament’s first duty with regard to public involvement is to afford to consider the public and 
all interested parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to make written or oral presentations at a time and 
in the manner that could influence the Parliament’s decision on the legislation concerned. On top of that, the 
government is also responsible to support and facilitate civil societies in their attempt to develop the nation, 
among other things, through helping them fully participate in the policymaking processes. 
In addition to the constitution, the regulation of HoPRs (Article 153) clearly sets the obligation to 
facilitate public involvement in their legislative and other processes and of their committees. Consequently, the 
standing committees are required to apply different ways to set up public forums and gather the opinion from the 
public, the concerned stakeholders and other invited experts and professionals to give their opinion on the draft 
law. Besides to organizing, the public hearings and the forums the procedure demands the committee, publicize a 
means for individuals who have not been able to attend the sittings, to give their opinions on the agendas (Article 
153:6). Moreover, the procedure allows the public forums to be prepared on the premises of the House or any 
other place.  
Nonetheless, the procedure of parliament expresses firmly that the committees should collect 
information pertaining to different experiences and practices; it does not clearly set in its procedure, the need to 
participate the public as a constitutional obligation for the house as policy makers and a right for the public. 
Furthermore which types of law/policy and at which level the participation of the citizen is reasonable and 
effective is not determined by the procedure.  
According to the response from the MPs’ a reasonable opportunity is offered to members of the public 
and all interested parties to know about the issues and to have an adequate say through public hearings unless the 
urgency of the matter limits the time for discussion. The HoPRs makes an open invitation for submissions to all 
interested parties, individuals as well as organizations, through the press and other media. Some questions were 
raised to assess how the citizen’s participation is in HoPRs law making process. Unanimously, except the 
opposition MP, all leveled the participation of the public, civil society organization (CSO) and expertise in at 
intermediary level while think-tanks and research groups are in a lesser extent. Contrary to this, however, the 
opposition MP ranked all the participation of citizen, CSO, expertise research organization and other think thank 
groups is at a much lesser level.  
Moreover the MPs noted that there are neither ‘‘healthy’’ CSO nor strong political pressure groups that 
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can initiate alternative policy ideas pro the interest of the people and development that can influence the 
government into changing the direction of policies. According to their views, no institute can be mentioned as an 
interest group or think-tank group or research institute as basically working with the House in consulting and 
providing information to support the legislature to formulate and pass effective legislation and perform effective 
scrutiny of government.  
Nonetheless, during the interviews, the chair persons of standing committees revealed that the effort 
made by the House to involve the public is not that much satisfactory enough for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the institutional arrangement for public hearings is not enough to promote a sense of awareness about policy 
initiatives amongst the public; and the knowledge of the public about the legislative institution itself is limited. 
The systems that are used by the House to help the public participate are limited. For instance, the public 
hearings are limited to Addis Ababa. The house lacks a well developed information technology system to give 
all the public access to hearings. Secondly, because of past long authoritarian history of the country, most of the 
people are not participating and those who come to attend are not coming with full awareness and motivation to 
influence the policy ideas; sound political culture has not developed yet.  They also claimed that neither the 
public nor the CSO’s are in a position to create strong political pressure and force government into changing the 
direction of policies in a significant extent. However, the chairperson of the standing committee and MPs, agree 
that ideas given by the public and CSO would be incorporated unless they are irrelevant or in contradiction to the 
pillars of the government policies and programs.  
The opposition MP, mentioning the land lease proclamation as an example, noted that the floor 
organized by the House is not only limited but is also carried out for the sake of formality. He also claimed that 
members of the ruling party in the parliament always believe the draft proposed by the executive are neat and 
complete to the desired level.  As a result, the public hearings as well as the reading sessions are wasted in 
editorial works rather than on debates in policy directions and contents. 
Survey responses of the academics and civil societies, also describe that the public, civil societies and other 
interested bodies participation is not adequate in the process. Their claim can be summarized as follows:  
a. Most policies are not presented for public discussion; policy makers encounter a significant question 
and even those presented for public discussion are presented as ‘finished products’, and prior 
consultations are not usually held with the public before those policies are formulated. As result policy 
makers mostly observed back to open discussions with the grass root after the policy legitimated and 
publicized. 
b. Public forums are organized for the sake of formality, and comments and concerns raised in those 
forums are not used as input to amend and/or change the draft policies so that the draft laws/policies 
presented for public discussion are almost always issued as the final version. 
c. Usually, the only opportunity for public participation during law making is the public hearings at 
parliament, though the hearing is limited to the Addis Ababa community. They added not only the 
scope for public participation in the policymaking process is inhibited, but the room for demand 
articulation and aggregation by civil societies and stakeholders is also weak. The effort made to 
enhance quality participation and representation of diverse views in such discussions is said to be less.  
d. Lack of culture to involve in public dialogue, and active citizenship added with an ambiance of 
withdrawal and self-censorship, biases and lack of civic activism from the side of many of the experts, 
and misgivings against the government are mentioned as major problems for the low participation of the 
public in the policymaking process. 
Moreover, respondents from CSOs claimed that the proclamation on the Charities and Societies has 
marginalized and disabled the attempts made by CSOs (for instance as the forum organized by Inter-Africa 
Group) to create forums for public dialogue and debate on policy matters. The Proclamation has already 
precluded CSOs’ getting foreign funds from participation in policy formulation area, specifically, policy 
advocacy.  
They also noted the participant CSO mostly mentioned by the MPs are mass organizations sponsored by 
the government. According to them these organizations are not capable of filling the gap since they are not seen 
as ‘‘neutral’’ but they are rather, ‘‘appendages’’ of the ruling party and hence subject to the democratic 
centralism principles. In the words of a leader of one CSO:  
These organizations lack both the capacity and the commitment to be genuine platforms for public 
debate and discussion on policy matters. Instead, they serve as instruments of indoctrination by the 
ruling party; while they don’t have any chance to influence its policies-relation between the two has 
always been of one-way traffic. 
The aforementioned discussion shows, the relationship between the House and citizens, CSO, research 
organizations and think-tank groups is weak. The members did not know even about think-tank group called 
(Center for Development Studies) established before a year ago with the aim to promote and facilitate the 
national interest, multiparty democracy, constitutionalism and democratic developmental political economy 
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through independent public policy research, analysis and advice.  
There is a substantial lack of trust between the House and CSOs; the House suspects some CSOs’ have 
political interest and are politically affiliated, where as the CSOs’ consider others groups such as mass 
organizations as government-inspired and financed institutions whose neutrality is subject to question in the eyes 
of non-MPs. Moreover the representativeness of the participants for a particular constituency or social interest is 
not adequate and also need to be considered. These concerns indicate the importance of parliament legislating to 
provide both a facilitative and a transparent framework within which the organizations of civil society can 
operate. The German Bundestag, for example, has specific rules stipulating that groups wishing to express or 
defend their interests before the legislature must be entered on a register. The Polish Parliament was at the time 
of writing processing a bill on lobbying activities, which it defines as any kind of activity carried out by lawful 
means aimed at influencing public authorities to take into consideration arguments and interests of specific social 
or professional groups (Beetham, 2006). 
The researcher had got an opportunity to participate in the public hearings held on Megabit 27, 2005. 
The policy issue was on the inspection of the FDRE human rights action plan (2003-2007) which was proposed 
by the Council of Minister. The House publicized the public hearing to the general public to attend or make 
submissions through the Ethiopian Radio, Television, and letter written to access to deliberations. Invitation had 
also been made to respective bodies from different ministries, agencies, civil society organizations, political 
parties in letter attached with the draft document. Consequently, about 33 people attended the public hearing 
excluding participants from the House. These were: 10 people from the civil society organization, 18 Expertise 
from the government offices, 2 people from political parties, 2 people from the citizen,1 participant from Gonder 
University, and 11 members from the Standing committees.  The attendance shows that there is an effort to call 
for participation from diverse groups though the number of the participants needs improvement. During the 
public hearing, the task force established from the Human Rights Commission of Ethiopia, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ombudsman that drafted the law briefed the overall process of the development of the 
plan/policy.  
The participants forwarded so many questions and comments including their threats that since the 
document has been approved by the council of ministers, their suggestions may not be incorporated. They also 
expressed their concern that the document was fully complied with full intention of the government and lacks the 
interest of the public. The public hearing was not enough as the action plan is the national level and citizens at 
the grass root level must involve in view of the fact that the human rights is the issue of everyone.  
The floor was wide open to hear all the participants and every participant got a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard and to make written or oral representations at a time including comments blaming the government 
freely, and all the questions and suggestions are recorded electronically. The records of meetings and plenary 
session verbatim transcripts are documented and available to the public in the library of the HoPR. 
The task force accepted some of the comments and tried to answer the questions raised by the 
participants. Worth mentioning concerning the participation of the public in the process of the policy drafting, is 
the confirmation that about 33 floors are organized at the center as well in all regions. During the discussion, 
some participants expressed their threats that their suggestions may not be incorporated, mentioning their 
experience that the government is not willing to change its policies.  But the chair person spoke firmly that their 
comments would be taken if they are convincing and he invited those who have any additional comment to 
submit written representations in the manner that could influence the decision on the legislation concerned. 
Nonetheless, this should not be a grantee to consider the views expressed by members of the public in the 
legislation, the researcher observed there, an open mind that demands to hear all the participants, and the public 
hearing was a good enabler to Parliament to inform itself of the views of the people.  
Moreover, there is an attempt to offer media coverage (news, press release and programs) to the 
meetings of parliament, and committee oversight activities; transmit discussions and avail members’ votes to the 
public through television and radio programs. This will have a significant contribution to inform and educate 
citizens if properly handled and used. 
The other important requirements of the parliament that should be considered as a basic issue, is the 
need for parliamentarians to be accessible to their constituents so that they can fulfill their democratic and 
constitutional obligations as representatives of the people. Pursuant to the Procedures and Code of Conduct of 
the House, Article (102-104) any member may, where necessary, meet with the people that elected him at any 
time of his choice including when they are in recess. However, the number of times in a year is not specified in 
the regulation, all the respondents from MPs’ explained that they are visiting their constituents only twice a year. 
The fact that most MPs’ is often far away from citizen’s their attempts to reach and consult their representatives 
on a continuous basis, gather information and used as a source of input into the policy-making process is limited, 
compared to the other countries such as Zambia where the fixed office is established equipped with the 
professional assistant for each constituency. In Zimbabwe as well, the establishment of Parliament Constituency 
Information Centers (PCICs) in all 120 constituencies, as a base for parliamentary generated information, the 
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centers enable the public to be involved in the legislative process from a more informed standpoint (Beetam, 
2006, 183). The center also holds a socio-economic database of the area, regularly updated, which serves to 
identify some of the most pressing issues and areas of need in the constituency. Such type of center/institution is 
absent in Ethiopia; there is no clear system except reporting, to collect the issues raised by each constituency 
such as Issue Bank as in the experience of other countries. 
The importance of the public participation in the public policymaking process has got a constitutional 
protection; the need to facilitate public participation is also outlined in the procedure of the House. However the 
procedure of parliament lacks an important factor relevant to determining reasonableness in the involvement of 
the public in the legislative process. Providing sufficient access to the public to participate relies on the good will 
of each committee’s decision. Besides public hearing, HoPRs requires an independent organization aiming at 
conveying the views, aspirations and proposals of the civil sector to the Parliament. In most countries 
independent organization facilitate the Forum of Parliamentary Dialogue to activate the dialogue between 
parliament and the citizen to further communication. Such organization does not exist in Ethiopia. 
From the aforementioned discussion, it is possible to understand that the participation of the citizens 
and CSO and other stakeholders is not as much as to articulate their demand and influence the policy.  The 
relationship of parliaments with civil society organization and outside researcher can be said to be immature. 
Lack of a sound political culture together with the absence of CSO and strong political pressure groups that can 
influence government policy, impede the experience of a participatory policymaking process in Ethiopia. The 
involvement and direct participation of the public in the policy legislation process needs improvement.  
 
Institutional Infrastructure and Capacity of HoPRs 
The Legislature enjoys both the powers to make laws and to oversight the performance of the government. 
Lawmaking requires reconciling differences once articulated, as well as pressing the legislature’s claim to power 
against the executive and other power-holders, such as political parties. It requires legislative processes capable 
of reconciling conflicts and bringing to bear enough expertise to be taken seriously by the executive branch and 
other actors in the system. The challenge, however, is how to find a balance between an empowered Legislature 
and an effective executive. In other words, for parliamentarians to effectively carry out their respective oversight 
roles and responsibilities, it is not sufficient for them to have legal authority. Therefore the next discussion 
focuses on the assessment of institutional infrastructure and resource of the HoPRs. 
 
The Human Resource in the HoPRs 
1. The Members of the House 
The Constitution article (54) stipulates that members of HoPR are elected for a five-year term on the basis of 
universal suffrage and by direct, fair, and free elections held in secret ballot. Accordingly, members shall be 
elected from among candidates in each electoral district by a plurality of votes cast; and members of the HoPR 
shall not exceed 550 of which at least 20 seats are reserved for minority nationalities 54(3). 
Though, it is impossible to specify the level of knowledge of the legislature that is necessary for law making, 
there is a general consensus that the parliamentarians, as a higher power holder of the country, must have the 
capacity to run  their responsibilities. Thus, this researcher has tried to see the educational, regional and gender 
composition of the MPs’ to get some insight on the existing parliament.  
Table: 7 The Regional, and Educational level Composition of HoPR for the Fourth Term 
Region No. of 
MPs 
Coverage   
in % 














Oromia 178 32.5 49 89 27 - 2 11 
Amhara 138 25.2 32 62 39 1  4 
SNNP 123 22.5 30 56 19 11 - 7 
Tigray 38 6.9 11 18 2 - - 7 
Somali 23 4.2 7 8 3 3 2  
Afar 8 1.4  1 1 - 6  
Benishangul Gumuz 9 1.6 1 5 2 1 -  
Gambella 3 0.5 2 1 - - -  
Hareri 2 0.3 - 2 - - -  
Diredawa 2 0.3 - 2 - - -  
Addis Ababa 23 4.2 15 3 - - - 5 








Source: The HoPRs Achieves  
 
As can be seen in table 7, the educational attainment of the members of HoPR shows that, Oromia, Amhara, 
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SNNRP and Tigray cover 87% of the seats as they are covering the largest population. Oromia has the highest 
representation in the HoPR followed by Amhara, SNNP and Tigray. The remaining 13% MPs’ come from 
emerging regions (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambels and Somali) Harari, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.  The 
above table portrays that 147 (26.7%) of MPs hold Masters Degree and above, and 247(45.1 %) have Bachelor 
Degrees. The educational composition can be considered relatively adequate in the Ethiopian overall literacy 
context or compared to the educated population of the country. However, it can also be said inadequate 
compared to the developed countries and the analytical capacity that a policymaking requires.  
In almost all societies, politics has been a traditional male preserve, and there have been considerable 
barriers to women’s involvement. Even in Western democracies the extension of the suffrage to women, the 
opportunity for access to public office came relatively late. As per the 2006 record, women represent only some 
16.4% of all legislators in the world’s parliaments (Saige, 2008).  
Although it demands a full-fledged research work to examine the real participation of women and their 
influence in realizing their benefits, women representation is not an end by itself in which women as human 
beings take their fair share in political decision makings through representing their proportion in the society 
(Judith, 1999). The fact that political representation is a means to achieve the purpose in which the interests of 
the members and their constituencies are taken into consideration in parliamentary decisions, women 
representation is likely to be a criterion for parliaments. The following table demonstrates the sex composition of 
the MPs in the four consecutive terms of office. 
Table 8: Gender Composition in the Four Consecutive Terms of Office  
Parliamentary Term Sex Composition Total 
 Male Female 
In No. In % In No. In %  
1st term 1995/96-2000 534 97.6% 13 2.4 547 
2nd term 2000/01-2005 505 92.3% 42 7.7 547 
3rd term 2006-2010 430 78.6% 117 21.4 547 
4th term 2010-March, 2013 395 72.2% 152 27.8 547 
Source: The HoPRs Archives 
 
The data in table 8 shows, previously gender parity were far from being attained in the HoPRs. The number of 
women in 1995 election constitutes only 13, (2.3%) out of 547 seats while after the 2000 elections 42 (7.6%) of 
the elected MPs’ were women. This data show that women were not considered as capable of decision-makers.  
But there has been progress in the latter’s representation. During the third election, the government had 
attempted to increase the number of women legislators to 30-50% of the house, through different measures. In 
response to gender parity particularly the ruling party (EPRDF) introduced a gender quota system that committed 
the party to reserve at least 30% of seat for women candidates to promote women’s participation in legislature. 
Consequently, the number of women holding seats rose to 117 (21.4%). Currently out of the 547members of 
parliament, 152 MPs (28%) are women. These women are actively engaged in various standing committees. This 
is three times as many compared to previous elections and acceptable proportion like in many European 
parliaments.  
Besides, Legislature experience is one of significant factors for the house to have specialized members. 
The limitations on the number of tenure a member may serve differ from country to country; in some countries 
legislators can be immediately reelected, but up to only two legislative terms. Others, such as Mexico and Costa 
Rica, prohibit immediate reelection of lower house members. The table under here shows the extent of the 
turnover of MPs’ in HoPRs. 
Table: 9  Re-elected MPs’ in HoPR 
Regions Total No of MPs No. of re-elected MPs Terms of Parliament 
Oromia 178 32 31 MPs -2 times;  1MP-   3 times 
Amhara 138 25 23 MPs-2 times; 3 MPs-3 times; 1MP -4 times 
SNNRP 123 25 All are elected 2  times 
Tigray 38 20 16 MPs- 2 times; 3 MPs- 3 times;  1MP – 4 times  
Somali 23 4   2 MPs – 4 times; 2 MP – 2 times 
Afar 8 3   2 MPs – 2 times; 1 MP – 3 times 
Gambela  9 1 2 times 
Benishangul Gumuz 3   
Harari 2   
Addis Ababa 2 2 2 times  
Diredawa 23 1 2 times 
Total 547 113 (20%)  
Source: the HoPRs Achieve 
Although, the opportunity to be a candidate is in the hands of the parties, table 9 dipicts that MPs’ in HoPRs are 
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not prohibited from re-election and serve the House for another tenure term. Consequently, 113 (20%)  MPs 
were-elected and have got the chance to serve the house for more than two terms. Of 113 re-elected members, 
four members were elected four times; eight, three times; and the rest one hundred one members were passed 
through two terms. Therefore, having over hundred experienced MPs will contribute much for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the HoPR unless it is prohibited by other matters.  
The other component that determines the effectiveness of the parliament is the political will that the 
strength of the desire of parliamentary leaders and members have to exercise or expand the powers of parliament 
and their personal motivation to influence policy.  In this regard, for the questions raised on their political will 
and their personal vision to continue as MP, most of them responded that except the vision they share from their 
party, they do not have a personal vision to continue as a legislature since their fate to persist as MP is decide by 
their party.  
Moreover, the researcher envisages that the aforementioned dominance of the government in the 
policymaking, the narrow political space given to the legislature to make laws, together with the imbalance 
between the two that characterize the house as insufficient capacity will have a negative effect on their 
institutional consciousness.   
Despite the fact that not least people perceive the MPs as uneducated, sitting only to vote for their 
party’s interest, the educational status is found at sufficient level to carry out their duties if supported by on job 
trainings made by the house to enhance their capacity. However like in most parliamentary countries, what 
deems necessary is, building the confidence of the people on HoPR through parliamentary reform. For instance 
the Australian House of Representatives carried out a reform with the aim to keep the parliamentary institution 
relevant to the needs and perceptions of the public it represents (Beetam, 2006: 189). The Canadian Parliament 
describe ‘Restoring public confidence’ as part of the objective of reforms; and the Netherlands Parliament has 
identified ‘Working hard to regain citizens’ trust’ as the impetus behind its many recent initiatives since an 
essential characteristic of democracy is to make people feel represented by them (ibid). 
 
The Administrative Staff Capacity of the House 
There are about 360 employees who run the office of the Parliament. The Legal Drafting, Research and 
Oversight Professional Support Directorate /Yehig Awotat, Yekititlena ena kutitiir Muyawi Digaf Directorat/ is 
the main support staff for law making and legal research function of the parliament. The directorate organized in 
two sections called: Legal Research, Information and Library Team /Yetinatna, Mereja ena Library Team/ and 
Meeting Organizer and Printing Service Team/Yesibsebana Yehitmet  Agelgelot Team/. Based on the structure of 
the Directorate, 126 personnel are expected to be deployed and serve the standing committees and MPs on 
law/policymaking issues. 
Each standing committee has its own officer and secretary. The structure also holds researchers and 
subject specialist case teams, professional librarians, information technology engineers and technicians, and 
minute organizers. The legal drafting and research case teams comprise three case teams: social issues case team, 
economy issues case team and legal issues case teams. The case teams are responsible to carry out research, 
collect evidence from witnesses, scrutinize legislation and conduct inquiries and prepare briefing material for 
members of the committee. The expertise in the case teams are the most important bodies that can offer specialist 
knowledge, in-depth analysis and information on a specific subject matter to meet the needs of the committee in 
performing its law making function. They are responsible to conduct research on different policy issues. 
Moreover they liaise with committee clerks in responding to requests from Members of Parliament and 
committees, and help prepare briefing papers on subjects of public and parliamentary concern. There are also 
statisticians that are responsible in analyzing statistical research products. The following table shows the existing 
human resource and the vacant positions under the directorate. 
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Table: 10 the Human Resource Capacity in the Legal drafting, research and oversight professional support 
directorate 




The Legal Drafting, Research  oversight  professional support 
General Directorate 
  
Standing Officers 16 16 
Secretary of the Directorate & Standing Committees 17 17 
Legal Research, Information and Library Team    
Social Issues Research Case Team 9 1 
Economy Issues Research Case Team 10 1 
      Legal Issues Research Case Team  10 4 
Library  10 9 
Information Technology 9 6 
Meeting Organizer and Printing Service Team   
Minute organizer and editors  18 16 
Translator 7 2 
Electronic Equipment Technicians 3 2 
Printing 17 16 
Total 126 90 
Source: The Human Resource Department at HoPRs 
 
As shown in the table 10 above, the parliament office has done much to organize the structure with relevant and 
specialized human power.  For instance the structure of the three case teams which is responsible for research 
policy issues, draft laws, monitor legal drafts, plan and reports that are proposed by the executive are organized 
consisting of 30 experts, each team is allotted to have about 10 positions that consist from junior to senior 
expertise.  However most of the positions on specialized teams are vacant. There are only eight experts of whom 
half of them are at junior level; and each case team has only one or two expertise whose dual responsibility to 
serve the 547 MPs and the sixteen Standing Committees overwhelm their number and capacity.   
Human resource capacity is almost non-existent in the area of research and skills for policy analysis that 
are essential for supporting the key legislative functions.  According to the interview notes with the standing 
committees and the directorate, most of the positions are vacant for the reason that the market could not avail 
them. They also believe that the professional and skilled personnel available are inadequate in number and lack 
the capacity to provide relevant and adequate support to the standing committees. Although the committees, in 
all cases, endeavor to fulfill their mandates, their work has been severely hamstrung by the very weak human 
and financial resources available. Lacking the required technical expertise, the committees have to rely on 
experts for the scrutiny and analysis expected of official reports. 
A random interview with experts also revealed that there are complaints by the members of the standing 
committee. But they noted, this is not because of lack of the capacity, rather the office is not using their expertise 
on such strategic issues and most parliamentarians were oblivious of the existence of the researchers and very 
few had ever attempted to use their services. 
Parliaments by their very nature are often made up of representatives with varying backgrounds and 
expertise. In addition to lack of time, the immense range of policy issues with which parliament deals (e.g. 
Education, Health, Energy, Finance, etc.) makes it impossible for any single MP to be an expert in all areas; 
therefore, it becomes absolutely critical that research information is repackaged and presented in a meaningful 
form for use by Members of Parliament. 
Particularly, in parliaments where executives are dominant and are encouraged to initiate laws/policies, 
they inevitably have to rely heavily on the staff for expert knowledge and advice in any new policy they 
recommend for legislation. In view of this fact, the capacity of the case teams of HoPR seems unthinkable to 
deliver their responsibilities. The HoPRs lacks the necessary expertise and knowledge that would understand the 
very nature of the subject matter that needs legislation.  
Scholars agree that in practice especially those in emerging democracies, increasingly rely on 
information from researchers in universities, research institutions, think-tanks and civil society organizations to 
complement the work of the parliamentary research team. However, in Ethiopia,  not only is the capacity of the 
research team low but the connection between the parliaments and research institutes is also not bridged. To sum 
up, lack of adequate professionally staff skilled in research and analysis impedes the HoPR to play their 
deliberative roles in policy issues effectively and advance the legislature’s institutional autonomy, and reduced 
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the capacity of the legislature to deal with the executive branch across a wide range of topics in sufficient depth 
and to be serious governing partners. 
 
Financial Resource of HoPR  
The HoPR’s financial resources are secured in a separate line in the national budget, treated like any other 
ministry, and agency of government. Once approved, the budget moves from the Ministry of Finance and is 
placed under the control of the clerk of financial administration section of HoPR. The issue here is whether the 
HoPR’s annual subvention is adequate to support the organizational needs and personnel emoluments.   
 
Table 11: The Budget of HoPR and Compensation and Allowances of MPs over the Past Five Years (2008-2013)  
 Year Annual Budget of the House Compensation and Allowances of the MPs 










2008/9 58,025,152  3000 250 for Chair person  
200 for D/Chair person 
150 for members  
850 - 
2009/10 61,637,100 6% 3000         ‘‘ 850 - 
2010/11 71,135,106 15% 3000         ‘‘ 850 - 
2011/12 96,759,498 36% 4050         ‘‘ 850 - 
2012/13 101,730,000 5% 4050 400 for Chair person  
300 for D/Chair person 
200 for members  
1500 450 
Source: Finance Procurement and Property Administration Directorate 
 
The above financial record in table 11 demonstrates the HoPR has enjoyed an increment in funding over the past 
five financial years, receiving 58.02 million Birr during 2008/9, 61.6 million in 2009/10, 71.1 million in 2010/11, 
96, 7 million in 2011/12 and 101.7 million for the current year, 2012/13. Except the steady increase reflected 
consequentially in the upward adjustment of salaries for parliamentarians, (receiving in 2011/12 a monthly salary 
of  3000 birr that was appreciated to 4,050 birr in 2011/12), the budget increment compared to the inflation 
happened in the past two years can be counted as negligible. However the House is supported by United Nation 
Development Program (UNDP). For instance UNDP donated 21,321,622  birr for the 2012 budget year, intended 
to build the capacity of the House.   
 Put the budget side by side to the role and function of the House and compare it to other countries, the 
budget of the House is relatively less. Legislators’ the primary clients, are particularly hard hit by the imbalance 
that circumscribes generous emoluments. Their current monthly salary of 4050 birr is meager in the context of 
expected financial obligations and comparison with salaries of MPs in the sub-region. For instance in 2007, the 
basic monthly salaries for MPs in Kenya and Uganda was $10,000 and $3,000 respectively plus sitting and other 
allowances. In absolute terms, Ethiopian MPs are therefore the least remunerated in the sub-region. The 
members are also financially constrained to consult their constituencies regularly to learn about local needs and 
solicit inputs for lawmaking and policy debates.  The per diem paid for field work of 280 birr is not enough to 
cover their cost. As the payments are not satisfactory, it scarcely meets their essential requirements of the MPs’. 
Surprisingly enough, most of the MP’s are accepted justifying it on the grounds of the capacity of the country to 
pay.  
 
Physical Resources of HoPR 
The office of HoPR could be said to have reasonable legislative house however, it could not be named as one of 
the most modern legislative chambers in Africa. The oldest but impressive architecture of the House is fully 
equipped with the communication technology system and has ample space for, the public and the media during 
sittings. The Speaker, his deputy, the parliamentary committees and, several other officials has adequate private 
office space; each of the fifteen Standing Committees has their own office, and meeting rooms. Moreover there 
are adequate facilities and equipment such as, sound systems, phones, photocopiers, all said to be sufficient for 
what is required for the institution to function effectively. However MP’s do not have individual offices or 
workstations, there is a space for them to share in groups; they scramble for space in the overstretched committee 
meeting rooms or within the library to do individual or private work.  
The MPs have no complaint on the facilities. Though not fair to say everything is facilitated, the 
premises have created a good working environment to enable the MPs to engage in informal interactions. This 
condition will have a contribution to speed up effective and productive, pre and post-sitting interactions among 
parliamentarians and engagement.  
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Regarding the ICT infrastructure, a local area network has been deployed across departments and units 
with reliable Internet connections. An email system is facilitating communications among MPs and staff of the 
HoPR. A website also provides a Web access to parliamentary news, proceedings, proclamation, and other 
information including the profile of the House. However, the Website is not equipped with tools that make it 
possible for users to pose questions, send comments, take part in discussion forums and opinion surveys and 
subscribe to newsgroups according to their personal preferences; the house is yet to fully integrate ICT into its 
business operations.  
The Parliamentary library built in the premise provides a service to both the house and external 
customers though is not spacious enough to accommodate a reasonable number of patrons at one time. The 
proclamations, minutes, and other relevant documents of the business of the houses are documented and 
accessed by the customers. However MPs noted that the library is not adequately stacked with relevant reference 
materials. The researcher observed the library is barely filled with the research outputs, and journals published 
by research organizations and universities. The Internet café provides service within the library. It has about 40 
desktops. Since the MP’s are offered personal laptops, the 40 desktops in the library can be considered enough.  
To sum up, the educational level, gender composition and experience of the MPs’ is in an agreeable 
level bearing in mind the standard of the country and the effort made to boost their capacity with on-job trainings. 
However, the internal capacity is weak to serve as an informed critic and a refiner of proposals shaped mainly by 
outside actors in the executive branch or in the party system. Consequently, the committees will be forced to rely 
on experts of the executive for the scrutiny and analysis expected of draft bills and official reports, and this will 
again hamper the effort to enhance independent legislation. The inadequate remunerations and allowances for 
MPs as well as the absence of legislative assistants and financial constraints stifle regular interactions with 
constituents, to travel regularly for consultations and information gathering, inputs from citizens into the 
legislative processes could be minimal. This condition makes difficult to ensure discharging own responsibilities 
and meeting citizens’ expectations, concerns and priorities. All of this clouds the effectiveness of the House in its 
effort to law/policymaking. 
 
Challenges of HoPRs in the Policymaking Process 
In many jurisdictions, the challenges confronting Parliaments in the law/policymaking can be explained on the 
basis of the number of Houses engaged in the policymaking process, formal power given to the legislature. 
Moreover, the amount of political space/discretion afforded by other power holder, most importantly by 
executive and parties; the ability and attitude of parliament regarding its functions and institution play an 
immense role (Saiegh, 2008; Beetam, 2006). Also significantly, the capacity of parliamentarians to scrutinize 
and debate on the draft bills proposed by executives is handicapped by the tendency of the incumbent executive 
branch of government to marginalize the legislature. 
1. Fusion of powers between the executive and the legislative branches 
As it is the case of parliamentary government, there is fusion of powers between the executive and the legislative 
branches. Moreover, the HoPRs and the executives are enrolled only by the member of ruling party. The strong 
ties between the two organs of government creates more trust, than engagement of legislature to their institution;  
permit little opportunity for legislators to take an independent stand and this in turn lowers down the 
participation of the legislature to approval of  legislation on narrow terms. More importantly, the competence of 
the executive, together with its resource power, initially, reduced the confidence and the commitment of MPs’ to 
debate, criticize, and challenge the bills submitted by the executive; the HoPRs cannot perform its best with 
respect to its task of challenging the executive ideas, as ruling party members have a clear unconditional support 
towards their political party. As Howlett & Ramesh (2003) revealed, the House is tightly organized along party 
lines, and marked by a high degree of cohesion and discipline.  The greater loyalty to their political parties than 
the electorate may reduce their concern for the legislature as an institution. Through time members will lack a 
vision or concern for the power and development of their legislature as an institution. As John & Robert (1999) 
noted unless at least some key members are concerned about legislative power and the legislature, it is unlikely 
to improve. 
2. Limited contribution of a bicameral structure to policymaking process. 
In the case of Ethiopia, the first among other factors that greatly affects the effectiveness of parliamentary 
law/policymaking is lack of the House that can assists the HoPR in the lawmaking process. Since the second 
house-HoF, is a non legislative parliament, the bill might not be exposed for the more thorough scrutiny, and to a 
different range of opinion which prevents the house from ill-considered legislation, from being passed into law. 
Though some respondents noted that, the upper house is a political affiliated institution established from the 
ruling party and would not have an impact; it is in the HoF that the state and regional perspectives, or a wider 
range of experience or expertise will have an opportunity to produce further concessions in the proposed 
legislation. 
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3. Low involvement of opposition parties in the House 
Although political parties are currently not held in high regard by the public at large, they are nevertheless 
indispensable to the working of a democratic parliament. Operating as they do in both the spheres of government 
and citizen, they serve as an essential bridge between the two. In the present situation, as far as the composition 
of the HoPRs is concerned almost all are the members of the ruling party. Therefore, talking about the 
opposition’s involvement here seems feeble. Suffice to say, the non existence of oppositions, has significantly 
diminished the way to alternatives decisions proposed by the government of the majority representatives in 
power.  
4. Limited involvement of the citizen in the policymaking process 
Regarding the extent of participation of citizens in the policymaking process, constituencies, sectors and 
concerned interest groups are not given sufficient opportunities to be heard and to present their side on 
legislative issues. As it stands, the House does not conduct state or town-level public hearings and is confined in 
the capital city Addis Ababa. However, Committee meetings are open to the public despite that the procedure 
lacks an important factor relevant of parliament lacks an important factor relevant to determining its 
reasonableness of involving the public in the legislative process. Providing sufficient access to the public to 
participate relies on the good will of each committee’s decision.   
Moreover, the HoPRs lacks organizational procedures that promote further amicable communications channels 
between the HoPRs and the citizenry and civil society organizations to activate the participation of these 
organizations in the policy making process of HoPRs. Besides, the trust between the CSOs and the government 
is not well developed, the suspicion between retarded the participation.  Legislators and constituents rarely 
interact. The twice travel of MP’s  in a year is not adequate for MPs’ to reach and consult their representatives 
on a continuous basis, gather information and used as a source of input into the policy-making process. 
Moreover, there is no fixed office or center that enables the MPs’ to improve constituents’ access and interaction 
with the MP.  
5. Low institutional capacity of the house   
Despite the fact that systems of divided government tend to vest greater independent lawmaking and oversight 
authority in legislatures, legislatures in all systems frequently lack the human and material capacity required to 
utilize the powers they do possess. With no doubt effective law/policymaking depends on the experts and 
adequate resources (both financial and manpower and technical), especially for the standing committees. 
Exercising law making entails a diverse range of issues, most of which are highly complex and difficult to 
comprehend without either MPs’ seasoned experience or accumulating years of knowledge. If they do not have 
such knowledge and experience, attempting to debate on the draft bills and challenge the executive becomes 
extremely difficult. However, the experts found within parliament rarely match the experts of the governments. 
Till the end of this research, for instance, an acute staff shortage has obviously been surfaced in the areas where 
it has been badly needed, namely in the fields of professional legal support and research.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
In view of the theoretical context and the empirical evidences discussed in the preceding chapters, this chapter 
provides conclusions and recommendations. The Constitution, under Article 55 (1), and the rules of procedures 
and members’ code of conduct of HoPRs Regulation No.3/2006, under Article (4), provides enactment of laws 
as one of the major functions of the parliament. Apparently, in most countries, members of the parliament and 
the committees in the parliament are entitled to introduce legislation. Besides, the Constitution article (77) 
defines the executive prime role in the policy process is to formulate and issue new policies or modify old ones; 
and Regulation No. 3/2006 under article (50) stipulates that initiating laws is mainly the duty of the government. 
Every ministry in the country is also empowered to initiate and/or formulate laws and policies by PMO. This 
vividly shows that power of policymaking is vested on both the HoPR and the executive; and it does not 
however give full expression to the notion of separation of powers. This is certainly the case of all 
parliamentarian governments that a fusion of powers, paradoxically, is the power it gives to the executive, not 
the legislative, arm of government. Since the majority is made up of members of his /her own party, the head of 
government can use these supporters to control the legislature's business, thus protecting the executive from 
deadlock, passing any laws which are expedient for the government.  
Therefore, the gigantic power and capacity, together with the close link between the legislature and 
executive enabled the latter to ensure exclusive leverage in the policymaking process.  Besides, the belief of the 
MPs’ that policies should be initiated by government or party leadership based on the party ideology from the 
beginning, depicts that the effort that the government/ruling party has been put forth on initiating policies not 
only restricted the potential contribution of the legislatures but also hinder the legislature to fully understand the 
rational and justification behind the need for legislature to initiate policies.  
Though a revolt by members of the government's own party is possible for MPs in examining and 
legitimating the policies, party discipline along with a tendency by many MPs to maintain their position for the 
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next election makes such a revolt unsatisfactory. Often, MPs’ are reluctant to debate and challenge a government 
that is made up of their party leadership for fear of being perceived as disloyal and as members have a clear 
unconditional support towards their party. All this will clearly impact the concern of the MPs’ and their 
institutional consciousness for the legislature to stand as an independent institution. Besides, because of the 
minimal involvement of the opposition parties in the parliament, the benefit obtained from genuine political 
opposition which is a necessary attribute for democracy, tolerance, and trust in the ability of citizens to resolve 
differences by peaceful means, is loose in the existing parliament. This would mean that the legislature has little 
choices of exploring alternative public policies beyond the boundaries of the established party lines. Hence, the 
Elites are dominating the policymaking process of Ethiopia. 
Nonetheless, to the researcher view, in Ethiopian Context, the elites have had relevant experience to 
stipulate nationwide priorities since they have been struggling for more than 20 years as a rabble fighter for 
freedom, social development and democratic rights. To be critical, policy driven tangible practices have 
undeniably, brought about relevant social, political and economic growth and development for the nation. 
However, other parties’ participation and suggestions as an alternative reference point have received limited 
attention. That is why the researcher has concluded that the policy formulation process precisely can be 
categorized with Elites theoretical perceptions. Moreover, the important thing that should not be forgotten is that 
the cooperative relationship between the executive and legislature serves to facilitate the coordination of 
governmental powers and functions to formulate desired policies and implement programs of government; and 
provide the government a better ability to prevent policy gridlock/stalemate that may hinder the effort to fasten 
development.  
Unlike, in conventional federal countries, the policies in Ethiopia are adopted only by the lower house-
HoPR. In view of the law making, HoF is not enjoying the power of legislation in much the same manner as 
countries that have long instituted a parliamentary system of government. Appreciating the arrangement of the 
Ethiopian parliamentary government system in recognizing the reality of the country, being a non-legislative 
power, the remarkable issue here is, the policymaking process in Ethiopia is lacking the expert, the perspectives 
and the scrutiny and the clearance of the policies from being ill considered that can be provided by the second 
chamber. 
The Constitution under article 43 (2), consists of democratic provisions that help to empower citizens to 
actively and freely participate in any activities including the policymaking process. Moreover, the government 
established a decentralized structure to enable the system to amplify the participation of the citizen in decision 
making, and increase the accountability of government. This depicts that the government has a firm stand to 
entertain pluralism through citizen participation in decision making. Being a democratic developmental state, the 
pluralist model of policymaking should characterize the Ethiopian policymaking process. However the 
participation of the citizens, and CSO and other stakeholders is not as much as to articulate their demand and 
influence the policy. Firstly, the procedure of the HoPRs lacks the important factor relevant to determining 
reasonableness in the involvement of the public in the legislative process, since providing sufficient access to the 
public to participate relies on the good will of each committee’s decision. As a result the public hearings are 
confined only in the capital city, Addis Ababa, and lacks adequate and sufficient involvements. Secondly, due to 
lack of sound political culture, citizens are not well conscious of the role of legislature and the benefit that can be 
secured from participation in the parliamentary hearings. Thirdly, there are no strong political pressure groups 
capable of influencing the government. Though there are CSO, lack of trust is deterring their participation. 
Fourthly, the relationship between the parliament and outside researcher organizations such as universities can 
be said to be immature. Fifthly, MPs are visiting their constituencies only twice a year. Compared to other 
countries, such as Zambia where a fixed office is established equipped with the professional assistant for each 
constituency Ethiopian MPs attempts to reach and consult their representatives on a continuous basis, gather 
information and use it as a source of input into the policy-making process is limited. Moreover, there are no 
independent organizations that can facilitate the Forum of Parliamentary Dialogue to activate the dialogue 
between parliament and the citizen.  
Lawmaking requires reconciling differences once articulated, as well as pressing the legislature’s claim 
to power against the executive and other power-holders, such as political parties. This requires legislative 
processes capable of reconciling conflicts and bringing to bear enough expertise to be taken seriously by the 
executive branch and other actors in the system. However,  lack of time, and immense range of policy issues 
which the parliament deals with make it impossible for any single MP to be an expert in all areas; therefore, it 
becomes absolutely critical that research information is repackaged and presented in a meaningful form for use 
by Members of Parliament. In view of this fact, the HoPRs administrative staff is found deficient of the 
necessary experts to understand the very nature of the different subject matters that need legislation to serve as 
an informed critic and a refiner of proposals shaped mainly by outside actors in the executive branch. Thus the 
HoPR is forced to rely on experts of the executive for the scrutiny and analysis expected of draft bills and 
official reports, and this is again hampering the effort to enhance independent legislation.  
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The factors affecting the effective policymaking role of the legislatures has been also dealt with. Thus, 
fusion of powers between the executive and the legislative branches and strong party discipline limited the 
contribution of a bicameral structure to policymaking process, less involvement of opposition parties in the 
House, limited involvement of the citizens in the policymaking process and low institutional capacity of the 
house are the major factors that are impeding the HoPR to appear as strong legislative institution.   
 
Recommendations 
Based on the above facts and reality, the following points are recommended.  
1. Fusion of powers together with its resource power, paradoxically, enables the executive to control the 
legislature's business, and passing any laws which are expedient for the government. In this regard the 
researcher recommended two options that are used by different countries to curb the executive power.  
Hence, the Ethiopia government structure should respond to this problem by instituting or retaining 
bicameral legislature, in which both houses must pass legislation, provide the second chamber a legislative 
power. Since it is believed that the government's future is not at stake in the second House, members in this 
House can be freer to counter balance and challenge the action of the executive and maintain check and 
balance. A second approach to curbing executive power is the election of the responsible house by some 
form of proportional representation, as in the case of Japan. This often, but not necessarily, leads to 
coalitions or minority governments. These governments have the support of the legislature when their 
survival is at stake, but less absolute control over its proceedings. More importantly MPs should fully 
understand the rationale and justification behind the need for legislature to initiate policies and should 
extend their loyalty for this conciseness and to the will of the people (as it is stipulated in the Constitution 
article 54 sub article 4) more than their parties. Therefore, the parliament should take the necessary steps to 
upgrade the competences through short training especially concerning the needs and importance of their 
policymaking role, to revolt the executive. The understanding of the MPs can also be leveled through 
experience of exchange with other countries parliament. Moreover, the parties in the country should be 
dedicated to present capable candidates who can cope up with the power of the competence of executives 
for election.  
2. The political environment should be enhanced to create a conducive conditions for the growth of rational, 
disciplined and strong political parties, and   to encourage a multi-party setting and promote a more open 
and plural politics. This will offer the legislature with wide choices of exploring alternative public policies 
beyond the boundaries of the established party lines. 
3. The internal functioning of the House, the human, financial and physical capacity of the House, should be 
enhanced. The House should be equipped with competent human, financial and material resources to be able 
to carry out research and identify issues, to draft laws, and to scrutinize the proposed laws. Moreover, the 
House should promote its partnership with, research institutions, think-tanks and civil society organizations 
to complement the work of the parliament. More importantly, as most parliamentary countries did, building 
the confidence of the people on HoPRs, building the capacity of legal drafting, research oversight teams 
through parliamentary reform deem necessary. 
4. When, for several decades, the source of law has been external to the Ethiopian people, such a radical 
concept as public participation in policymaking is understandably difficult to fully comprehend. What is 
thus needed to break the stronghold of past tradition is continuous education of the people. Thus the 
government, the HoPRs, political parties, Medias and other democratic institutions should involve in 
building the awareness of the people to participate fully in the policymaking process. Moreover, the House 
should promote independent legal consultants and researchers (policy think-tanks) to flourish, that can 
initiate, supplement and consult the House on policymaking and other policy issues by producing more 
scholars in the field of public policymaking. 
5. Although the procedure of parliament expresses firmly that the committees should collect information 
pertaining to different experiences and practices; it does not clearly set in its procedure, the need to 
participate the public as a constitutional obligation for the house as policy makers and a right for the public. 
Furthermore which types of law/policy and at which level the participation of the citizen is reasonable and 
effective is not determined by the procedure. Thus, it is necessary for the parliament to relook in to its rules 
and procedures for public participation to ensure that the public is offered a meaningful opportunity to 
public hearings and debates. The citizen should be given a chance to influence policies, and bring in a much 
more representative policy-making that can realize policy ownership to enhance the implementation of the 
policies. 
6. The government shows its commitment to effective policymaking through different initiatives. One of the 
initiatives is the establishment of Center for public Policy Studies at the Ethiopian Civil Service University. 
This can be mentioned as a good beginning to support and enhance the effort of policymaking institutions 
with sound theoretical tools in the field of policy science through specialized education, consultancy, 
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training and research. This year’s graduates, the first ever in the country, should support the policymaking 
institutions all over the country through research and consultation and play their pioneer role in 
professionalizing and improving the policymaking capacity in all over the country.   One more, the center 
should promote its services to enable the institutions to make use of the professional support in every 
dimension.  
Thus, the researcher believes that the above measures, if implemented, will ensure effectiveness of legislature in 
policymaking process in Ethiopia.  
 
Future Research Areas Recommended 
The thesis focused on the role and function of legislature in the policymaking process. It also tried to show the 
close tie between the legislature and the government. The role of the third organ of the government-the judiciary 
and other non-institutional policymaking actors has not been examined. Thus research should investigate the role 
and function of these actors. Moreover future academic researches have to also reckon the other two functions, 
representational and oversight role of legislature.  
 
References 
Abueva, V. (2010. Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a parliamentary Government. Paper 
delivered at the Forum of the Center for media Freedom and Responsibility. Vol.2. Retrieved March, 
2013 from: http://www.dirp3.pids.gov.ph/.  
Alemante G. Selassie, (1992). Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects for Democracy. Retrieved March, 2013 from: 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol1/iss2/4. 
Assefa Fiseha. (2007). Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia: Exploring the Experience of the House of 
Federation (HoF). Paper presented at African Network of Constitutional Law conference on Fostering 
Constitutionalism in Africa Nairobi.  
Anderson, E. (2003). Public policymaking: An introduction. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Anderson, E. (2006). Public policymaking. 6th ed. Houghton Mifflin Co., USA 
Awel Ahmed. (2011). Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role In Ensuring Constitutionalism and Accountability 
Under the FDRE Constitution. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa 
University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Art. Addis Ababa University. 
Unpublished. 
Bazzell , Y. (2010). Assessing Japanese Government Documents: Policy Making Process and Documents. 
University of Hawaii Library. Retrieved April, 2013 from: http:// 
www.hawaii.edu/asiasref/japan/Articles/ceal. .  
Beetham, D. (2006). Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century. a Guide to Good Practice Inter-
Parliamentary Union, Switzerland. 
Birkalnd, A. (2001). An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts and models of public policymaking 
3rd ed. M. E Sharpe, Inc. Armonk, New York.  
Bogdanovskaia, I. (2008). The Legislative Bodies in the Law-Making Process. Retrieved February, 2013 from: 
http://www.otan.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/.  
Carney, G. (1993). Separation of Powers in the Westminster System. information paper on Parliament and 
Government in Queensland. 
Clarke, E. (1999). American public policy: An introduction. 6th ed. New York, St. Martin’s Press. 
Cloete, F. (1995). "The State Policy Machine": transition to democracy: policy perspectives, OUP: Cape Town.  
Datta, A & Jones, N. (2011). Linkages Between Researchers and Legislators in Developing Countries: A 
scoping study. Working Paper 332, Overseas Development Institute. Westminster Bridge Road: 
London. 
David, M. & Michael, L. (1991). Legislature in the Policy Process: the dilemmas of economic policies. 
Cambridge University Press. 
De Coning, C. & Fick, J. (1996). “A development perspective from analysis to process facilitation”. Africanus, 
Vol. 26(2). 9-45. 
Denis, J & Ian, D. (1989). Chamber Political Systems of the World. Volume I & II. Helicon Publishing Ltd: UK. 
Dror, Y. (1968). Public Policymaking Re-examined. Intex Educational Publisher: New York. 
Dye, T. (2005). Understanding Public policy.11th ed. Pearson Education, INC, New Jersey. 
Edward, C. (2004). Their Word is Law: Parliamentary Counsel and Creative Policy Analysis London School of 
Economics and Political Science: London. 
Etizoni, A. (1967). Mixed-Scanning: A third Approach to Decision Making Public Administration Review. 
Fasil Nahum. (1997). Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect on the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Unpublished. 
FDRE Constitution, 1995, Proclamation No. 1, Negarit Gazette, 1st Year, No. 1.  
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.5, No.1, 2015 
 
166 
Florencio, B. (1997). Should the Philippines turn parliamentary? Retrieved March, 2013 from 
http://www.pcig.org.  
Franchino, F. (2008). Legislative Policymaking in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict and 
Institutional Constraints. Paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 25 
- 27 September 2008 University of Latvia, Riga: Latvia. 
Giliomee, H., James M. & Lawrence, S. ( 2001). “Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in 
South Africa.” Democratization. Vol 8(1), 161-182. 
Gilliat, S. (1984). “Public Policy Analysis and Conceptual Conservatism.” Policy and Politics, Vol.12(4), 345-
367. 
Grindle, M. & Thomas, J. (1991). Public Choices and Policy Change: the political Economy of Reform in 
Developing Countries. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Guy, B. (1999). American public policy: promise and performance. Chappaqua, N.Y.: Chatham House/Seven 
Rivers. 
Hallerberg, M., Scartascini, C. & Stein, E. (2009). Who Decides the Budget? A Political Economy Analysis of 
the Budget Process in Latin America. Washington, DC and Cambridge. Harvard University. 
Hanekom, S. (1987). Public Policy: framework and instrument for Action. Macillan South Africa Ltd. 
Johannesburg. 
Hanrahan, C. (1995). Making Public Policy Health a Vision for our Community’s Health. The New found land 
and Labrador Heart Health Program, St.John’s, NF. 
Heath, R., Bayer, S. & Robinson, T. (2005). Women on the Sidelines: Women’s Representation on Committees 
in Latin American Legislatures. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49(2): 420–36. 
House of Common. (2005). Business of the House and its Committees: a short guide. House of Commons, 
London. Retrieved February 2013from: http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Parl-Pub-
legiscomm.pdf on. 
Howlett, M. & Ramesh, M. (1995). Studying Public Policy: policy cycles and policy subsystems, Don Mills: 
Oxford University Press. 
James, G. (2005). Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Philadelphia: 
Pennsylvania. 
John, M. (2008). Presidential versus Parliamentary Government. Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 
prepared for UNDP. pp. 91-122. Retrieved February, 2013 form: 
http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/parliaments/Concep.  
John, K & Robert, T. (1999). A concept paper on Legislature and Good governance. Retrieved March 2013 from: 
http//:/Users/Administrator//Importnat%20%202/TheLegislature.htm. 
Keeley, J. & Scoones, I. (2003). Understanding Environmental Policy Processes: Cases from Africa. Earthscan, 
London. 
Keeley, J. (2001). Influencing Policy Processes for Sustainable Livelihoods: strategies for change. Sustainable 
Livelihoods lessons for Change in Policies and Organisations Paper No. 2. Brighton: IDS. 
Kraft, E. & Scott, R. (2004). Public Policy: politics, analysis, and Alternatives 3rd ed. CQ Press, Washington, 
D.C. 
Kumarasingham, H. (2013). Parliamentary Affairs: exporting executive accountability Westminster legacies of 
pxecutive Power. Journal of Representative Politics. 66(1). Oxford University Press. 
Lars, M. (2001). "A Short Note on the German Federal Constitutional Court and Its Power to Review 
Legislation." European Human Rights Law Review.  
Laver, M., & Shepsle. K. (1994). Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Leach, S., & M. Wingfield. (1999). Public Participation and the Democratic Renewal Agenda: prioritisation or 
marginalisation? Local Government Studies 25:46-59. 
Legese Tigabu, (2012). Budapest, Hungary, Central European University; Adem Kassie, University of Pretoria, 
South Africa). Retrieved from: http://www.slideshare.net/guestc2745c/comparative-us-and-eth on 
March 2013. 
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New 
Haven: Yale university Press.  
Lindblom, C. (1959). The Science of Muddling Through. Public Administration Review. 
Mandaville, A. (2004). Legislatures and Civil Society: potential partners in poverty reduction. Washington, DC: 
NDI. 
Mbaru, M. (2006). An Overview of the Competences of the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary in Africa. Cape 
Town, South Africa. Journal of Legislative Studies, 12(4) 443-461. 
Meheret Ayenewu. (1997). Public Administration in Ethiopia 1974-1991: Administrative and Policy Response to 
Turbulence, PhD Dissertation, New York. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.5, No.1, 2015 
 
167 
Mulugeta Abebe, (2005). A Critical Assessment of Institutions, Roles and Leverage in Public policymaking: 
Ethiopia, 1974-2004. PhD. Dissertation, South Africa.  
Müller, C. (2000). “Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: making delegation and 
accountability work.” European Journal of Political Research 37, special issue. 
NDIIA. (2001). One Chamber or Two. Legislative Research Series, National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs.  
Olson, D. & Mezey, L. (1991). Legislature in the Policy Process: The dilemma of economic policy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ornstein, NJ. (1992). The Role of the Legislature in Western Democracies. American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C 
Parliamentary Centre. (2004). The New Member of Parliament and Committees. Retrieved March 2013 from: 
http://www.parlcent.ca/publications/pdf/MPs%20and%20Committee.pdf.  
Parsons, W. (1995). Public Policy: An Introduction to Policy Analysis. Lyme: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
USA.  
People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, 1987. 
Proclamation No.691/2010. The proclamation to Determine the Powers and Functions of the Executive Organ of 
Government.  
Regulation No.3/2006, the Regulation of Working Procedures and the Members Code of Conduct of House of 
Peoples Representatives.  
Reynolds, P. (2011). The Separation of Powers in Queensland. Teritary Fact Sheet 2.1. Retrieved April, 2013 
from: http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/.  
Rogers, JR. (2001). An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicameralism. J. Theor. Polit.13:123–51 
Rose, R. (1976). The Dynamics of Public Policy. Sage Publications Ltd, London. 
Rowe, G. & Lynn, J. (2004). Evaluating Public-Participation Exercises: A research agenda. science, technology, 
& Human Values. Sage Publications, Inc.Vol. 29(4), 512-557.  
Rundquist, S., & Clay H. (1994). Building Legislatures in Latin America. In Lawrence D. Longley, ed., Working 
Papers on Comparative Legislative Studies. Appleton, WI: Research Committee of Legislative 
Specialists of the IPSA. 
Saasa, O. (1985). Public Policymaking in Developing Countries. The Utility of Contemporary Decision-making 
Models. Journal of Public Administration and Development. Vol. 5. 309- 321. 
Shugart, M. & Carey, J. (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. 
Cambridge, England. 
Saiegh, S. (2010). An Evaluation of the Policymaking Role of Latin American Legislatures: Active Players or 
Rubber Stamps? In How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin 
American Policymaking. Center for Latin American Studies Harvard University, Cambridge Street. 
Stewart, J., David, M. & Lesser, P. (2008). Public policy: An Evolutionary Approach. 3rd Ed. Library of 
Congress. Boston: USA 
 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management.  
The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following 
page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those 
inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version of the journals is also 
available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
Academic conference: http://www.iiste.org/conference/upcoming-conferences-call-for-paper/  
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek 
EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
